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The requirements of social and educative justice are examined further in the light 
of John Rawls's conception of justice as 'fairness'. In particular, critical response to his 
notions of 'the original position', 'veil of ignorance' and 'overlapping consensus' 
misrepresents the critical and creative capacity that these concepts properly denote and 
preserve in the interests of participants' 'strong' democratic capacity. 
The ethical implications of a non-authoritarian relationship between learners and 
existing discursive formations are then discussed with reference to Philip Wexler's 
'textualist' theory of social analysis and education. His advocacy of 'collective symbolic 
action' is found to be compatible with an uncoercive discourse ethic, oriented to mutual 
understanding and contextualised hypothesis formation by self-reflective agents. 
Inferences for education are proposed, in conclusion, emphasising the teachers' 
role as agent provocateur of the 'liminal imagination' (generating non-formulaic symbolic 
movement and self-formative struggle by the learners themselves), which qualifies the 
usual obligation to approved curricular content. Education for a postmodern democracy 
is sustained by, and sustains, both context-relative knowledge - publicly educed - and 
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The term 'postmodern' lacks precise or unitary definition, but is construed to denote a 
philosophical critique of 'the modern ideas of reason and the rational subject'. Baynes 
et al continue: 
It is above all the 'project Of the Enlightenment' that has to be 
deconstructed, the autonomous epistemological and moral subject that has 
to be decentered; the nostalgia for unity, totality and foundations that has to 
be overcome; and the tyranny of representational thought and universal 
truth that has to be defeated.! 
This thesis considers how the de-reifying and anti-essentialist implications of postmodern 
(re)writing can contribute to an education for democratic citizenship in South Africa, but 
without forsaking the integrative and emancipatory value of such normative notions as 
culture. truth and justice. Implicit in the postmodern perspective is a sense of knowledge 
and identity as non-absolute and radically unstable, being mediated and relativised by 
interpretative frames of reference that give" contingent form to the perceptions of socially 
situated human subjects. However, also implicit - it will be argued - is the desirability of 
a publicly ratified link between knowledge and experience. Thus, maximal receptivity to 
new and unpredictable data or danda2 should modulate with their intelligible reduction 
and systematisation and with the successful or unsuccessful testing of the emergent 
hypotheses under maximally explicit and publicly attestable empirical conditions. The 
crucial overlap between the postmodern and positivist tendencies is the destabilising role 
of a creative and critical 'openness' to difference. Any 'form' of hitherto ratified 
knowledge is thereby liable to alternative reinscription or substitution; the meanings 
deemed to be isorporphic with our experience are to be placed 'under erasure', to be 
exposed to the unsettling effects of 'otherness' - of unknown experiences, values, 
discourses, beliefs, perspectives - as the prerequisite of provisionally and always 
imperfectly validated representation. 
In order for this ongoing dialectical movement between explicitly conditional 
certainty and perpetual uncertainty to be democratic, however, all who are affected by 
the postulated resolutions and claims to relevant public knowledge must be empowered 
to participate equally in the process, as maximally autonomous thinkers. This poses a 
difficulty for educationists in particular, whose relation with learners is inherently 












cultural 'capital'. As Wally Morrow writes: 'Educative relationships cannot be 
relationships between equals, and it is misleading to suggest that learners can control 
their own education; at the same time educative teaching is anti-manipulative.'3 There is 
a tension between the students' dependence on the teacher for primary socialization or 
orientation, in respect of valued information or subject matter, and the requirements of 
free and equal, democratic participation in the construction of knowledge. This implies a 
contradictory dualistic role for the teacher - a responsibility for primary orientation 
within a relatively stable conceptual field, and yet also a responsibility as the 
non-manipulative catalyst of critical independence in the students. Teachers' privileged 
construction of primary co-ordinates fits uneasily with their role as unprejudiced 
facilitators of reflective autonomy in the students and of the destabilisation and 
contention this entails. 
As has been stated, a maximally reflexive and undistorted perspective on 
contending data is the precondition of autonomous participation in democratic 
hypothesis-formation. This flexible yet critical responsiveness by participants is an 
integral part of any process of public decision-making that would claim to be 
democratically accountable. If such democratic decision-making is always in process, 
then the renovating critical openness that exposes previous resolutions to conditional 
erasure is a strenuous ongoing imperative. This demands of participants a 
communicative commitment which, it will be claimed, differs from their customary 
ideological commitments. This commitment involves a normative respect for a 
communicative process of context-relative but historically unpredictable 
knowledge-formation, rather than for truth as a determinate object or theoretically 
finished product. This does not deny the pragmatic requirement of purposive, 
truth-oriented action in the real world; it merely ensures that such product-oriented 
action remains the representative expression of the autonomous (and therefore 
perpetually changeable) will of a self-governing citizenry. 
This thesis hopes to examine arguments that illuminate the central dialectical 
tension between stability and instability indicated above, with a view to exploring its 
educational pertinence in ideologically-riven contexts such as our own. In South Mrica, a 
legacy of social injustice has thrown into sharper than usual relief the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate rule, between authoritarian oppression and democratic 
self-government. In a situation such ~ ours, where the weight of historical and empirical 
evidence underwrites mass opposition to the current political regime4, the strenuous 











demand for united action (albeit that such action is advocated in the name and interests 
of democracy). Education for democratic self-government is not readily compatible with 
education for complete likemindedness, the former requiring as it does a supple 
decentering of stable selves and beliefs as the precondition of democratically 'centered', 
and temporarily validated, decision and action. Notwithstanding the inevitable and 
needful role of primary enculturation as a potentially enabling prerequisite of dialogic 
self-empowerment, it is the danger of putting conventional certainty before critical and 
explorative uncertainty that threatens the prospect of a self-reflectively empowering 
education. 
However, the impact of dominant material structures on the enabling potential of 
cultural norms poses difficult questions: discriminatory social structures impinge 
coercively on differentially situated subjects - being either privileging (through an 
advantaged alliance with dominant interests) or disabling (through a mystifying 
diminution of sectional or even majority interests). Nonetheless, the servile dependence 
of thought on material determinants is disavowed by a postmodem view of discourse as 
the dynamic, reformulable 'ground' of social perception and purpose. The provocative 
role of discourse as the unstable but self-empowering associate of social transformation is 
a crucial issue to be addressed. The pliancy bespoken by discursive movement is 
contrasted with a dangerous regard for 'theory' as the absolute determinant of practice 
instead of as the clarifying but fallible by-product and stimulus of better ways of coping. 
It is by keeping in motion the necessary relation between guiding truth-perspectives (or 
theory), experimental public hypotheses, and radical openness that the danger of reifying 
either conceptual abstractions or material determinations may be guarded against. 
Accordingly, a postmodern democracy - as articulated in this thesis - will give 
pre-eminence to the mutually decentering interaction that sustains and is sustained by the 
solvent power of what could be termed the' 'liminal imagination'. C.A Bowers comes 
close to this idea with his reference to the creation of a 'liminal cultural space' that is 
opened up when traditional forms of authority are contested and 'delegitimatized'. This 
relativising of conventional cultural authority provides 'a moment when the voice of the 
individual matters' and one can participate in the negotiation of new forms of authority.s 
However, if the liminal cultural space opens an opportunity for languages of possibility to 
gain an entry, it also presents a danger to the vulperable, culturally-exposed individual, 
whose inherited codes are not necessarily sufficiently rich or stable a foundation for 
self-assured critical engagement with and judgement of new contenders for cultural 
authority. The vulnerable individual, in Bowers' terms, may lack the 'communicative 











is at the mercy of authoritarian influence, so the person shorn of all traditional 
assurances cannot hope to share meaningfully, as a critical partner, in the creation of 
society. If a process of democratic government is to engage people as mutually 
responsive partners, worthy of equal respect, then it cannot also require the summary 
erasure of the traditional beliefs that effectively comprise the whole self-concept of 
certain participants. Our unseen ideological circumscriptions need to be exposed to 
critical consciousness, with the help of others, but if a dependency relationship between 
the newly demystified individual and an alternative order of meaning is to be avoided, 
then the liminal space must be preserved as the non-restrictive arena for generating and 
exploring culturally unsettling notions. It is arguably this vigorous transforrnative 
capacity that undergirds the aspiration to democratic legitimacy through a maximally 
enlarged collaborative community, the expansion and inter-animation of which must put 
in question the divisions that exclude and marginalise what is 'other' in specific contexts 
of value, belief and action. It is the challenge of maintaining a dynamic relation between 











CHAPTER ONE: CULTURAL AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
At the centre of the educational quest for democracy, clearly, is the challenging role of 
leadership and authority in bringing the learner to a state of critical independence. 
Autonomy is acquired via a process of enculturation which provides necessary 
foundational coherence for dependent beginners, but which also disposes them to a 
largely predeterminate view of the world. This two-edged nature of meaning-acquisition 
does not disappear for those who have 'graduated' to adulthood. Autonomous 
participation in democratic self-government therefore remains a testing social and 
personal ideal. 
Of general significance is the matter of 'limits' - the limits that are placed on 
democratic decision-making, either explicitly or covertly. Such limits are traceable to 
largely conventional axioms of thought - to principles or ground motives that condition 
a world-view in keeping with certain interests. Priority is accorded to competing 
'independent grounds' by different interest groups, not least of all in the South African 
context, a fact which complicates the task of a democratic politics. That foundational 
principles are recognised to be essentially contestable, in keeping with postmodern 
insights about language, has intensified our awareness of 'difference' as creatively 
life-enhancing but also as radically threatening. Despite the potential for critical 
self-revision, the lack of reliable co-ordinates also increases the danger of others' 
manipulative influence. 
The link between learning and politics is discernible in Morrow's statement that 
'Politics is the interpersonal activity which creates and sustains the conceptual schemes 
which order social relationships'.6 On this view, the field of conceptual meaning (created 
by interpersonal activity) orders our social life. The paradox, however, is that such 
interpersonal activity is itself part of, and generated by, our meaning-filled social life. 
Thus, anterior meanings are self-evidently implicated in the interpersonal activity that 
creates meaning. The same testing interplay is apparent in Peter McLaren's statement 
that 'Culture is never depoliticised; it always remains tied to the social and class 
relationships that inform it'.7 Here, the nature of the causal link between cultural 
meaning and relationships is ambiguously expressed by the word 'tied': patterns of 
relationship hereby 'inform' culture, being manifested in the meanings and practices it 
embodies; at the same time, unless such interpersonal meanings and practices totally 
elude human intention, they may be assumed to be liable to alteration or confirmation 











may therefore be recognised as a dynamic social construction; but the power of individual 
reason to apprehend the dynamics of the surrounding world is qualified by 
embedded ness in a culturally-specific communal context. The degree to which this 
structural embeddedness imposes limits on change by a critical citizenry is clearly a 
crucial question. 
Central to the discussion, therefore, is the concept of 'culture' and its formative 
relation to variously situated communities of belief. Communities may be conceived in 
terms of culturally distinct criteria - giving prominence, for example, to such typical 
categories as race, class, and the individual. Accordingly culture may_ be understood as a 
precess of structural signification helping to make life intelligible and manageable. 
Culture is constituted as a shared symbolic code infused in our social practices; and 
socialization into community life entails the internalisation and adoption of its 
symbolically encoded and mediated values, beliefs and practices. As has been noted, the 
degree to which this socio-ideological inscription of the subject continues to happen 
either unconsciously or consciously, critically or uncritically, is a crucial issue. 
The contested nature of the link between communities and classes in South Africa 
highlights the challenge of establishing an acceptable relation between 'authoritative' 
social analysis and popular perception. 'Non-class elements can be and often are a part 
of class consciousness', writes Belinda Bozzoli, noting that in South Africa 
'community-expression appears to take place primarily through non-class forms of 
consciousness' (such as the ethnic, populist and nationalist ).8 The criterion selected has 
a marked influence on a community's self-perception and on the 'forms of struggle and 
resistance' that it adopts in a context of felt oppression. It is in this respect that the 
vocabulary surrounding the popular democratic movement in South Africa has been 
criticized: Tony ~orphet notes that the populist rhetoric of People's Education, for 
example, awkwardly incorporates divergent frames of reference, such as those of 
nationalist, socialist and liberal traditions9; Richard Levin, too, regards the use of 
concepts such as 'the people' and 'the community' as unhelpfully broad, lacking clarity on 
the need (in his view) for working class leadership in the democratic struggle against 
'capitalist forms of schooling'.10 The mass movement might well appeal to broadly 
democratic sentiments but what will have to be acknowledged, it seems, is the reality of 
divergent definable priorities in working towards a viable programme of communal 
action. Yet Thornton and Ramphele remind us that 'community' is also 'the 
unpredictable product of history' and that while we 'may aim at the achievement of 











political processes and exist in history, not above it'.ll Clearly, both premature 
polarisation and superficial identification aTe to be avoided if publicly accountable, 
democratic renewal is the ongoing goal. 
An important issue is whether the interests of democracy are best served by respect 
for people's own perceptions of their experience (however unjust or mystifying these are 
held to be by analytic observers), or by attempting to guide such communities towards 
more enlightened conceptions and practices. The latter is a particular temptation in 
contexts where repression has curtailed the formation of an inclusive public sphere. 
While Levin sees class-defined community to be an a priori requirement of democratic 
struggle, Bozzoli, like Thornton and Ramphele, highlights the empirical reality of 
'impure' forms of community expression that defy 'abstractions, teleologies and 
ideal-types'.12 Levin acknowledges that people in South Mrica experience their 
oppression differently 'due to class and other social differences', but nonetheless asserts 
that within this diversity 'the most fundamental' category is clasS.13 The 'expert' 
authorisation of fundamental analytic categories is a familiar and dangerous political 
ploy, however, used to claim legitimacy for prescriptive programmes of action. 
Proponents of any political persuasion, including opponents of the government, are liable 
to do this, in Thornton's view, and so inadvertently to replicate the power structures they 
oppose.14 
The preceding arguments reinforce the tension between deductive and inductive 
uses of public reason, a tension that is prominent in current educational debate. Morrow, 
for example, alludes to the alternative tendencies in distinguishing what he calls the 
'contemporary view' of education from the 'Aristotelian view'.IS The former is the 
traditionally dominant approach, given to an instrumental view of education, governed by 
an established theory and vision in accordance with which specific learning objectives are 
set and a structured learning programme implemented. The students are expected to 
assimilate a pre-specified package of knowledge, in the service of authoritative a priori 
goals. Relationships and beliefs are manipulated to meet with determinate 
requirements. The result of the educative process should be predictable in advance; 
teaching and learning should be geared to the efficient realisation of this end. Education 
is liable to be viewed as an instrument of social policy - in either official or oppositional 












In contrast, the Aristotelian approach is not oriented by a substantive goal or 
product, but is rather committed to education as a more flexible process of ongoing 
discovery, generated unpredictably by the learners, with non-manipulative assistance by 
the teacher. No rigid, predetermined framework is coercively imposed on learners in the 
service of larger social ends; instead meaning is actively created by all. Joint exploration 
by the learners is at the centre, so that their diversified experiences and perceptions may 
contribute to a mutually stimulating learning process. Morrow writes: 
On this view the verb 'educating' is more appropriate than the noun 
'education' as it is not based on a clear-cut or substantive vision of 'the 
future'. At best it has only a formal or procedural view of 'the future', a 
commitment to certain principles of non-coercion and non-manipulation, 
and to the idea that the detailed shape or form of society will be discovered 
and generated in the processes of political struggle and persuasion.16 
In evident contrast to Levin, who sees People's Education as needing a more definitive 
commitment to the economistic categories of class struggle, Morrow sees the Aristotelian 
approach to education as being more openly inductive, undirected and 'fundamentally 
conceptual'. Accordingly, a prerequisite of liberation is a new way of speaking, to be 
achieved through a process of self-made 'discussion'. People's Education, in Morrow's 
opinion, promises to help us invent the practices that will foster such open discussion,11 
Despite Morrow's confidence in the democratic potential of People's Education, 
others sound warnings concerning its authoritarian possibilities, symptomatic of the 
'contemporary' instrumental view of education as evinced so destructively by the South 
African government over many years. People's Education will be discussed later in some 
detail; what is of interest at this point is the relationship between its desired democratic 
functioning and concomitant socio-structural prerequisites. Peter Buckland, like 
Morrow, warns against the 'technical rationality' of instrumental education, which retards 
the development of students' critical autonomy. Changing the country's political 
structure, he writes, will not in itself guarantee that this manipulative mode of rationality 
will disappear. It poses as much of a threat in socialist as in capitalist st~tes.18 A.M. 
Barrett objects to the tendency, which he discerns, in both Christian National Education 
and People's Education, to impose 'bounds' on critical autonomy by tying the educative 
process to a specific sociological theory, so that admissible knowledge is effectively yoked 
to a pre-theorised power structure in society. What is crucial in his conception of 











and understanding'.19 Richard Aitken contrasts structural definitions of social 
relationship with a view of community as discursively rather than materially constructed, 
such that through interpersonal activity a 'conceptual and moral scheme' for ordering 
social relationships can be achieved, without negating 'the multiple significations in 
ambiguity'. There is real danger, he believes, 'in the growing discourse of abstracted 
terms, in essence emptied of substantive ideas of human agency and therefore ethical 
content'.20 In the same vein, Smith and Knight remark that 'The abstract world is a 
simple world of pure virtue and unrelieved vice, but it pulls in different directions as it is 
operationalised in the context of what capital and labour actually do in the world'.21 And 
Michael Ryan seeks to counter the over-simple binarism of objectivist logic by advocating 
a deconstructive practice of thinking that subjects 'natural' categories of whatever kind to 
sceptical questioning: 'the simple, habitual setting up of norms which define out 
secondary degradations, accidents, or deviations is to be put in question'; and opting for 
the 'reassuring macro category' rather than 'the troubling microanalysis' is to be avoided. 
The ambiguities and contradictions of our 'social and historical embedding' must be 
acknowledged, in contrast to conceptual abstractions such as the detached knowing 
subject.22 
Despite a common opposition to monologic certainty by the writers cited above, 
there is no obvious consensus regarding the substantive effect of such opposition. 
Whereas Aitken highlights discursive movement and ambiguity to give ethical substance 
to intentional human agency, Ryan turns to deconstruction to emphasise the 
contradictory effects of an encompassing social structure. It is precisely in reference to 
the substantive contradictions of our 'social and historical embedding' that materialist 
social theorists assert that structures for rational discussion (such as those Barrett 
requires) cannot be the detached medium of impartial reflection. The operation of such 
ostensibly impartial structures is held to be significantly influenced by structured social 
inequities which prejudice the process of rational debate in favour of a dominant interest 
group. Thus, determinate systemic change is claimed to be the prerequisite of discussion 
on equal tenns. This change must be undertaken by addressing what Rachel Sharp calls 
'the real political mechanisms at work in society', including socio-economic inequalities 
that inhibit the prospect of 'intellectualliberation'.23 What is needed, in her view, is an 
empirical theory of politics - as class conflict - that goes beyond an idealist faith in pure 
reason, and gives rise to alliances and strategies that will countennand the 'real 
conditions' of social injustice. Similarly, Lane et al argue that a concern for critical 











the cause of meaningful educational reform and of a more egalitarian and democratic 
society.24 
On the one hand, then, are proponents of a non-technicist, inductively 'open' 
approach to social and educational process, in the interests of democracy; on the other 
hand are proponents of objective analysis and programmatic social management, also in 
the interests of democracy. The former stress the danger of imposing absolutist 
theoretical categories on intentional human agents; the latter stress the danger of 
abstracting the rational agent from the structural dynamics of a real social context. 
These are not necessarily incompatible alternatives: as has been indicated, a central 
concern of this thesis will be a better understanding of the interrelation of positivist and 
postmodern tendencies, firing the creative dialectic between uncertainty and conditional 
certainty, between non-directive openness and substantive purpose. In emphasising the 
need to find a balance between continuity and renewal, between needful solidarity and 
creative detachment, C.A Bowers poses the central challenge for those concerned with 
non-repressive forms of social justice - in South Africa and elsewhere: 'The problem is 
to find the right balance between the potential of socialization to liberate and to bind, so 
that both the individual and society can grow in a manner that integrates the new with 
the positive aspects of the old.'2S This is a testing requirement, in terms of which the 
characteristic strengths and weaknesses of Christian National Education, liberal theory of 
education, and People's Education might be discussed and compared. The link. between 
receptivity-to-difference and normative resolution, which is evident in each, will give a 
greater degree of contextual specificity to the theoretical tensions considered in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
Christian National Education 
Christian National Education, In its alliance with a phenomenologically-oriented 
'fundamental pedagogics', demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling the practice of 
education as a 'universal' phenomenon with the authoritative claims of a specific 
traditional culture. The fundamental category is considered to be our 
'being-in-the-world', which involves us in relationships of dependency in our search for 
meaning; our purposive lives thus defy reductive objectification, but reality is always 
perceived through our culturally-relative, value-suffused conceptual frameworks. There is 
a distinction between penetrating the essentials of the 'agogic relation' - deemed to 











Our acquired world-view therefore sets limits to our capacity to disclose real essences in 
their 'primordial phenomenality'.26 
Much in the theory of fundamental pedagogics is unexceptionable, as typified by 
the expressed concern for an 'ennobling' relationship between educator and educand, 
and by a respectful benevolence towards learners, whose yearning for meaning must be 
'answered' by the teacher without negating their dignity as intentional beings or their 
potential for self-realisation.27 The educative relation is held to be one of 
'dignity-in-inequality' and responsible freedom: the learners are accompanied and 
assisted en route to independence and meaningful 'transcendence' of their mere 
'facticity', but without forsaking their 'pathic' involvement in life as a felt experience. 
However, while the teacher must be prepared to respond to the learners' appeals for 
help, without manipulating them, they must be willing to listen to the teacher's 
sympathetic counsel. This counsel is intended to ensure responsible guidance towards 
socially acceptable norms. The learners' perpetual ontic openness is not ever closed off, 
but their situatedness as social beings requires subjection to the supportive authority of 
cultural values and norms. Through elevating, educative dialogue the learners' 
world-view may be moulded and integrated with those of the community. The existential 
need for meaning will increasingly be met, and this security will enhance the learners' 
willingness to venture, independently, into other relationships en route to further 
autonomous self-actualisation or 'becoming'. The way to responsible freedom is 
therefore opened up by the teacher, whose benevolent accompaniment instils a respect 
for the authority of norms, in fulfilment of a cultural mandate. The universal educative 
relationship, so drawn, serves to socialise learners, without treating them as pasSIve 
objects who are closed to the future and lack creative intentions of their own. 
Although the idea that enculturation is a universal phenomenon is unobjectionable, 
Christian National Education seeks to use phenomenology to underwrite a culturally 
specific world-view. 'God has willed separate nations and peoples and has given each 
separate nation and people its own vocation', intones the National Education Policy act 
of 1967.28 The universality of enculturation thus becomes equated with the 'universality' 
of racially segregated cultures. This becomes one of the 'essential' truths revealed by 
phenomenological reduction, which is fed into education as a 'fundamental' reality, and 
which responsible teachers must respect in fulfilling their cultural mandate. (It is ironic, 
therefore, that racial prejudice has been the destructive corollary of an educational 
philosophy laying claim to the non-manipulative and undistorting activity of 











conjoined, so that a cultural norm is 'naturalised' as neutral fact; Christian teachers are 
ideologically reconciled to a contradictory regard for both openness and closure. 
In line with the above duality, J.A Heyns is able to write, on the one hand, that 
'being human' entails a being called to 'neighbourliness' - 'an alignment and openness to 
each other through which true neighbourliness will be created'. This fraternal 
'togetherness' is an image of our dynamic togetherness with God;30 accordingly our 
cultural identity is not permanent or static: 
Being human is to be culturally creative. ... The dynamic character of 
culture means that man can never remain in what was given historically but 
has to look for revision, change and renewal. Inherent in the social 
character of culture is the fact that men are not only individually creative in 
culture but that they are engaged communally in this activity. The ethical 
nature of culture means that one creates culture with others for others.31 
This admirable assertion of cultural openness and democratic participation is qualified, 
however, by a contrary assertion of structural fIxity: 
Being human is to live in structures. Apart from personal relationships man 
also has a supra-personal relation which may be called the structural aspect 
of the community. . .. Not all structures are changeable. There are 
God-given structures and structures created by man which one cannot 
ignore.31 
These structures are not arbitrarily superimposed on us but are validated by an 'inward 
imperative' which the responsible educator must respect in leading his wards to Christian 
citizenship in accordance with the norms, laws and relationships of a 'Godly community 
life'. Heyns does not claim value-neutrality for such Christian structures: there is 'no 
such thing as neutral education', and the educationist needs to recognise the 'intrinsic 
framework' within which he operates.32 The identification of culture and science here 
becomes complete - the responsible educator is likened to a 'Christian scientist'; the 
identification is not used to unsettle science, however, but rather to certify culture. (It 
would be left to the post-structuralists to highlight the anti-metaphysical implications of 
the hermeneutic circle as reflected in. the science/culture equation. The contradiction 
involved in presupposing insight into universal essences that are nonetheless articulable 











potentially liberating, decentering strategy, although it raises problems of its own for the 
'legitimation' of any form of public knowledge.) 
Although fundamental pedagogicians in the Christian National fold express 
approval of cultural openness and renewal, and of critical autonomy, they are apparently 
unable to subject their own 'ground motives' to reflexive bracketing. Too high a 
premium is placed on communal stability, solidarity and integration (within 
. pre-established limits); and it is in meeting this universal need for ontic security that 
educationists are deemed to find their true and responsible calling. The democratically 
expansive implications of 'neighbourliness' are similarly lost, owing to the 
compartmentalisation of communicative relationship along racial lines, enforced by law, 
and maintained up to the present in accordance with the 'principle' of group 
self-determination, especially in educational matters)3 The high priority placed on 
communal stability and cultural integrity, and on neighbourly alignments (narrowly 
defined in segregationist terms) has been the ironic cause of communal instability and 
fear. Divisive institutional structures have perverted the communicative structures 
through which alternative communal perspectives might jointly have been wrought. The 
neighbourliness and autonomy espoused by Christian National Education are therefore 
fundamentally compromised by their subservience to rigidly delimited notions of culture 
and community, resting on an injudicious conflation of empirical and transcendental 
categories. The lateral or 'horizontal' nature of interpersonal communication is 
incompatible with the 'vertical' nature of authority relationships and structures 
sanctioned by God. By confining horizontal civic relations within the vertical parameters 
of revealed truth, apologists for Christian National Education feel justified in rejecting 
the views of 'liberals' and of 'the people' as humanistic extremes, given either to radical 
individualism or to totalitarianism, which sca~t the value of communal culture in binding 
individuals and in distinguishing groups.34 
Liberal theory of education 
It has been argued above that Christian National Education forfeits the prospect of 
cultural renewal by equating enculturation (as a universal social phenomenon) with an 
ideologically specific, racial definition of culture. Liberalism has suffered a similar fate 
at the hands of its critics. This is inferred from Penny Enslin's defence of liberal theory 
of education, central to which is her distinction between an allegiance to individual 
freedom as an abstract or formal ideal, and the manifestations of individual freedom as 











liberalism is to make a formal point', she writes, 'rather than to offer a substantive 
characterisation of liberalism, as the latter must depend on the particular context'. 
Expressions of the liberal point of view are 'universally' distinguished by their concern for 
individual autonomy; but, Enslin adds, 'critics of liberalism have tended to commit the 
error of confusing some particular expressions of liberalism with its central, universally 
applicable characteristics'.3S There are many kinds of individualism religious, 
economic, ethical, epistemological, political, and so on; these are not all necessarily 
mutually compatible or the expression of liberal values in all contexts. The connection of 
liberalism with capitalism, for instance, is said by Enslin to be 'contingent' merely, and 
does not exhaust the civil liberties that attach to the concept of personal freedom. 
These civil liberties are the ideal fruits of a liberal education, necessary features of 
which are the promotion of individual autonomy and personal meaning (evinced by 
self-reflection and self-direction), respect for the dignity of persons, openness to and 
tolerance of others, and participation in discussion (entailing. a questioning of authority, 
awareness of topical issues, and independent reasoning). Freedom as 'positive' 
involvement with others in collective decision-making therefore coexists with a 
counterbalancing regard for 'negative' freedom from coercion. The emphasis placed on 
either negative or positive freedom, in a given context, will depend on communal 
perceptions of prevalent needs. Enslin accepts that there can be no absolute personal 
autonomy, but that within inevitable limits the maximum degree of autonomy should be 
preserved. Personal and moral self-mastery are crucial to the democratic process 
through which social agents fashion and delimit their communal lives; there is, 
accordingly, no necessary contradiction between a defence of individual freedom and a 
recognition of the socially constructed nature of knowledge.36 
Anathema to liberalism, in Enslin's scheme, is 'conservatism' - the moulding of 
learners in accordance with a retrospective cultural ideal. This counters the formation of 
intrinsic personal meaning and the ultimate achievement of critical independence. 
Equally incompatible with liberalism is held to be a commitment in principle to 
prospective social transformation. This, too, entails the postulation of a substantive 
order which, like Christian National Education, is felt to impose a limit on learners' 
reflective autonomy. A priori substantive commitments are not compatible with 
education aimed at the creation of a truly self-governing citizenry, even though the 
envisioned order is purported to be in the interests of greater substantive democracy. 
Barrett would concur; for him, 'reasoning' is 'not a respecter of cultural boundaries' but is 














necessarily, accept that there are no bounds that you ought 
on that process, otherwise you are engaging in indoctrination not 
position guards agains t dismissive 
right. However, it is problematic in 
or from the radicalism that 
is true to the logic of her formal/substantive 
nor radicalism can be viewed as u ............. ~u'" ••• 
as 'liberal' the Marxist's theoretical concern 
critical autonomy and maximal 
action and democratic self-control, she the n ... ,"rI,<;!nr'\<;! 
as pre-empting autonomous decision-making. makes n~<.""A"''' 
it fundamentally in conflict with liberal theory.38 
an a priori contextualised opposition to apartheid (in ................ " ..... 
of liberalism as practised in South 
........ ' ... V .. l.... a substantive taking-of-sides is held to typify 
with recent calls by others for liberals to join in a 
left, so forsaking a non-aligned position, in the cause of substantive 
Hofmeyr suggests that liberals 'should identify with black COilliIllU 
to control and participate in their own education and to develop 
the system', They must find the 'radical' elements of 
- a 
cause 
.............. .., into concrete projects, programmes and 
the interests of a 'non-racial, democratic, 
for an egalitarian liberalism, 
access to and distribution of social primary goods 
just society',4O 
implications 
the reality of extreme polarisation 
to signal their support 
.... " ... , .... ", of 'humane values' of 
more sne:CUlC still: the concern for an egalitarian, 






..... -"'>La .. , .... controL This is 
ueJmUiCnlCV is that the worker should power at 
should be controlled by those 
in a given context of oppression such as 
by its substantive political stance seems to 














acknowledgement that freedom must be limited when it causes harm to others, and that 
compulsion is justified in the cause of the long-term autonomy of the individual, when 
viewed in conjunction with the substantive orientations advocated above (from both left 
and right), significantly qualifies the fundamental distinction she draws between 
liberalism and the substantive ideals and commitments of either Marxism or 
conserva tism. 
The solution to such tensions, all would agree, is the achievement of reflective 
autonomy and democratic participation which would ensure that particular commitments 
flow from and are validated by collective understandings. While there. is merit in this, the 
dynamics of enculturation and the role of significant authority figures in this 
contextualised process complicates the ideal model. Any 'language of possibility' infusing 
individual perception mediates cultural information codes, the autonomous acceptance 
of which requires an ability to reflect on such codes with critical regard to one's 
established frame of meaning and discursive practices. As has been noted, primary 
socialization is effected through relations with significant others, whose influence cannot 
initially be subjected to reflective analysis and critique by the relatively unformed 
individual, whose discursive paucity inevitably curtails the requisite critical mobility. 
'Indoctrination' as the setting of bounds on autonomous reflection is a likely phase for 
the initiate into new cultural knowledge. It need not continue to be so; but breaking out 
of the circle of self-confirming belief requires the unsettling provocation of alternative 
conceptualisations and experiences, without forgetting that too pressured a sense of 
cultural vulnerability might induce either a reactionary reaffirmation of traditional 
identity, with consequent polarisation of positions, or mindless capitulation to vanguard 
cognoscenti - to the cost of critical collaboration. 
Such possibil~ties underline the need to secure a productive and equitable relation 
between social bonding and critical renewal, as advocated by Bowers. If the individual is 
not an unconditionally free entity, but is intersubjectively constituted through symbolic 
interaction with communal others, then education must acknowledge this 
contextualisation as a condition both of personal self-knowing and of critical self-renewal. 
'An understanding of embeddedness, of continuities, and of cultural and community 
membership seems essential to the formal educational process carried out in the 
classroom', Bowers writes; but he adds that this understanding 'needs to be balanced by 
an ability to make explicit (and then politicize) aspects of taken-for-granted beliefs and 
practices that are injurious in both an individual and communal sense'.44 However, given 











'significant others', the challenge is how to undertake the balancing act suggested by 
Bowers, at the same time giving due place to -the self-formative rather than manipulative 
use of the liminal cultural space. It is in the formative but never finally definitive arena 
of the liminal imagination that contending meanings jostle as the unprogrammatic 
stimulus of an inclusive community of debate. Substantive belief-commitments represent 
a form of purposive closure or definition that is given ongoing democratic warrant only as 
the product of a condition of such maximally inclusive openness. A truly emancipatory 
education-for-democracy will therefore have to make perpetual place for a relatively 
unproscribed liminal zone where the legitimacy of alternative belief systems may be 
subjected to multi-vocal contestation, maximally free of physical and ideological 
constraint. That the liminal imagination is not incompatible with ideological alignment -
being a potent source of ideological vigour without itself being of one party - will be a 
signal contention of this thesis. It remains to be asked how People's Education in South 
Africa measures up to the challenge of political and educational liberation, in 
comparison with the limitations imputed to both Christian National Education and 
liberal theory of education. 
People's Education 
People's Education is intended to enable 'all sectors of our people' to participate 'actively 
and creatively' in establishing a non-racial unitary democracy in this country. Critical 
thinking and analysis and collective input are valued as both educational and political 
goals, in contrast to the 'stunted intellectual development' and the 'capitalist norms' of 
competition and individualism associated with the system of apartheid.45 As has been 
noted, there is much in such aims that liberal thinkers can align themselves with - a 
concern for the dignity and participation of all, and for their full development consistent 
with the rights and well-being of others. However, in its rhetoric and composition, the 
People's Education movement evinces contradictory tensions. 
In particular, there is on the one hand an appeal for uncoercive alliances between 
ideologically autonomous entities; on the other, there is a stress on the authority of a 
particular leadership. The tensions appear, for example, in documents relating to the 
formation of a 'mass education movement' and the establishment of teacher unity. The 
Harare Conference on Teacher Unity (1988) voices a commitment to realising the goals 
of People's Education in South Africa, and - with reference to teacher support -
recommends that 'Ideology should not be a precondition for unity'.46 More recent 











'mass education movement' (MEM), as the educational ancillary of the mass democratic 
movement, envisages this as 'a loose alliance of organisations, each manufacturing (sic) 
its own autonomy' yet working closely together on individual campaigns and projects, 
which are to be 'discussed and consulted broadly in the spirit of democratic 
participation'. A comment is made on the valuable experience of learning to 'moderate 
our language', to 'tolerate others' and to appreciate 'the experience of broader aims and 
gains'.47 Eric Molobi writes elsewhere: 'The mass democratic movement is not a single 
class movement, it straddles classes and rallies masses on particular broad issues.' A 
'progressive' teachers' organisation, he adds, will mobilise teachers as an organic link 
with 'the masses'. He then qualifies the non-class nature of the alliance, however, by 
noting its intention 'to cut free from the apron-strings of the Bourgeoisie'.48 This 
qualification is symptomatic of the programmatic side of the education struggle. Thus, 
the MEM is indeed found to require 'an ideological basis for inclusion', to ensure 
maximum unity and to weld itself into a single force that counterposes 'all apartheid 
education schemes and programmes'. The leading role as 'initiator' and 'nerve centre' 
will be the NECC, at least until the movement can 'stand on its own as a coercive force', 
and can 'speak with one voice' and 'move in unison'.49 At the 1987 conference on 
Teacher Unity the role of the working class is seen by the NECC as paramount in 
achieving this solidarity within the broad front against apartheid. The working class is 
held to be 'the most reliable sector of the broad national liberation movement', and the 
national democratic struggle is therefore urged to strive for working class leadership.5o 
(Teachers are said not to be 'natural allies' of the working class an awkward 
circumstance, given that those in control of all teacher organisations, according to Ian 
Moll, are 'petty bourgeois'.51) Similarly, Jay Naidoo of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU - a prominent affiliate of the NECC) envisages a 'national 
union of teachers based on the democratic principles and practices of the workers' 
movement'. He sees People's Education as vital in breaking the bondage of 'apartheid 
capitalist education', and sees unity as a 'fundamental principle of socialism'.52 
Such accounts expose the divergent tendencies within the People's Education 
movement, associated largely with the articulation of equal participation within the broad 
front against apartheid in terms of working class leadership in the struggle ~or socialism. 
There is also a racial dimension to the vision of a, non-racial society. As Jakes Gerwel 
writes, 'the struggle for democracy is crucially linked to the majority character of our 
society' and is aimed at' 'non-racialism under African leadership'.53 Fatima Meer, too, 
calls for 'the widest and strongest black resistance', for 'one black people' in a 'united 











[he character of a pre-specified 'leadership' with the (unpredictable) expression of 
grassroots democratic autonomy is baldly illustrated in the attempt by M. Segwai (of the 
Black Consciousness Movement of Azania) to articulate the relation: 
We should never bully the people; we must patiently explain everything to 
the masses. That is the correct way to go about revolutionary work among 
the people, otherwise the dictum Liberation is the act of the people themselves 
becomes traversed (SiC).55 
In Segwai's version, a condition of self-liberating autonomy is that the masses be 
non-violently 'imbued' with a 'revolutionary theory and ideology'. (The dangers of such 
wen-intentioned but directive teaching have already been instanced in the case of 
Christian National Education.) A more challenging and credible expression of an 
emancipatory link between education and ideology in the South Mrican context is 
apparent in the mission of the University of the Western Cape. (UWC), committed on the 
one hand to 'free scholarly discourse and research' but also to an ideological identity as 
the 'intellectual home of the Left'. This is in recognition of the 'operative contexts' 
within which any university is said to operate, and is compared to the Mrikaans 
universities' context of 'Mrikaner nationalism' and the English universities' context of 
'anglophile liberalism' (in the account of the rector, Gerwel).56 Elsewhere, Franklin 
Sonn likens People's Education favourably to the self-empowering nationalism of 
Christian National Education, which originated in his view as a needful struggle against 
anglophile domination. The University of the Western Cape, in Gerwel's opinion, is 
today testimony to its own history of counter hegemonic struggle, and accordingly finds its 
'internal imperative' to be a 'critical alignment with the democratic movement'. Bearing 
in mind Heyns's earlier injunction concerning respect for the 'inward', self-validating 
cultural imperatives of Christian institutions of learning, an important question must 
concern the revisability of UWC's intrinsic, self-defining 'imperative'. The signal 
difference, in Gerwel's account, is perhaps UWC's 'creative' orientation towards a future, 
open 'community', in which 'social realities' are no longer suppressed through 
'discourse-censorship'. Such a commitment does not compromise an obligation to 'truth 
and science' but redeems it from the undemocratic abuse it has suffered under the 
existing regime. This openness is compatible neither with unreflective, unremitting 
'activism' nor with the studious avoidance of activism. Nor is commitment to 'the Left' 
intolerant of critical diversity; rather this is the sine qua non of the scholarly pursuit of 
knowledge. 'These scholars', Gerwel writes, 'command the frontiers of science and can 












scientist's autonomy, historically, has required defence against 'gods and politicians' -
the church and the state. UWC, too, seeks to defend that autonomy through its respect 
for 'diversity' and the 'right to the production of new knowledge'. But the 
non-sectarianism this implies needs to be 'historicised', GeIWel adds, to appreciate its 
relevance for us as producers of knowledge, contextualised within relations of historical 
inequality. This perspective is best represented, he claims, in the 'Congress tradition' 
(that of the ANC) - a judgement that is irrunediately challenged by Neville Alexander 
for effacing the relation between truthful social analysis and (in his view) 
socialist-inspired unity of action.58 
Discernible in GeIWel's line of thought is once again the subtle assimilation of a 
'formal' openness to a 'substantive' political or ideological position. This is necessarily 
characteristic of People's Education as both a political and an educational project, and 
accounts for the 'underlying tension' (in Ken Hartshorne's words) 'between statements on 
critical and creative thinking, active participation and democratic practices on the one 
hand "and implied alternative ideological pressures, educational controls and power issues 
on the other'.59 However, this tension, as has been shown, is not unique to People's 
Education. The same testing interplay is manifested in the arguments of variously 
liberal, radical and conservative theorists. Perception of the general need for 
cultural-ideological openness is tempered by the perceivers' identification with a 
particular socio-political cause or value system, with a bearing on contemporary 
problems. Nor should it be otherwise, if democracy is to have concrete social and 
personal meaning. There are certainly dangers in this identification, particularly for 
education, or for any relationship between 'leaders' and those whose interests they seek 
to represent or nurture. Nonetheless, it is a necessary identification for us as socially 
situated beings, and raises difficult questions with implications for educative leadership; 
for example, who controls the terms in which the identification is expressed, and who 
undertakes the analysis or directs the strategic initiative? Hartshorne expresses the hope 
that teachers will be able to maintain a 'broad' corrunitment to non-racial and democratic 
values rather than to a 'narrow' sectarian party-political ideology.60 This intimates a 
degree of political concern and moral awareness, while temporising on the matter of 
definitive truth or compulsory action. Whether this is a plausible position, especially in 
sharply divided social contexts, is one of the questions that this thesis undertakes to 
examine, with due regard for the difficulty of distinguishing educational and political 












Barber on democracy: participation and leadership 
What has emerged from the above consideration of Christian National Education, liberal 
theory of education, and People's Education is avowed support in each case for 
non-manipulative teaching, combined with support for a context-specific vision of social 
justice. In considering further the implications for democracy and for leadership in each 
case, Benjamin Barber's study on Strong Democracy; Participatory Politics for a New Age is 
suggestive.61 Barber distinguishes between three main kinds of democracy: 'thin' liberal 
democracy - in which individual autonomy is prominent but there is little collaborative 
involvement; 'unitary' democracy - in which a single communal voice is privileged to the 
detriment of divergent opinion and collaborative involvement; and 'strong' democracy -
in which personal autonomy is realised and sustained through ongoing collaborative 
involvement in communal decision-making. 'If the definition of democracy as popular 
sovereignty has any meaning,' Barber writes, 'then it is sovereignty over language - over 
talk fashioned by and for the talkers thernselves.'62 In order for this sovereignty to be 
maintained, public talk must be an ongoing critical and creative process, reflecting free 
and open communicative relationships amongst citizens who are all equally empowered 
and willing to share in this process. It is in the light of this requirement that the three 
kinds of democracy might be compared. 
'Thin' liberal democracy is portrayed as a travesty of liberalism's virtues: the latter's 
proper respect for private interests and individual autonomy here becomes selfishness; 
tolerance of others becomes passivity; respect for the law elicits bureaucratic 
extravagance; and liberty becomes 'anarchism'. Anarchism is one of the three so-called 
'dispositions' of thin liberal democracy, the other two being termed 'realism' and 
'minimalism'. The anarchist tendency is that of 'radical individualism', safeguarded by 
constitutional righ~s and duties encoded in the law. The free enterprise ideology 
harmonises with this belief in the separateness of self-determining individuals, who are 
not naturally disposed to conflict. Our natural 'atomism' is given formal warrant in 
judicial norms; in this. 'juridical democracy', however, power is something to be 
'contained', rather than creatively used and collectively participated in. The realist 
tendency is more cynical concerning people's 'natural' disinclination to interfere with 
each other, and is given to a more authoritarian politics of 'power, law and control'. 
Individuals are viewed as competitors within finite territory; the law, accordingly, is a 
prudent defence against others, within the mutually respected limits of which private 
interests may be pursued without interference. This makes for democracy in the 











co-operation. The minimalist tendency in thin liberal democracy accepts the reality of 
intra-communal difference and conflict, instead of denying it (as the anarchist does) or 
repressing it (as the realist does); but this acceptance, which marks democracy in 'the 
pluralist mode', comes to entail passive toleration of others and their differences, rather 
than creative interaction with them. The minimalist politics of 'toleration, pluralism and 
non-interference' still places private preferences at the centre, making for a fragmented , 
citizenry and a 'reticent' form of public reason. In all three cases, public affairs are 
administered by representatives to whom civic responsibility is delegated as a technical 
matter, maintaining the legal framework that impartially secures the negative liberties of 
each separate person. 
This portrayal of thin liberal democracy does not exhaust the liberal position, 
although its three main 'dispositions' describe particularly prominent historical 
characteristics. In the South African context, the liberal aversion for uncompromising 
sectarian alignments, and the faith in an harmonious accommodation of differences tend 
to pull against the harsher tendencies of realist 'power, law and control'. The liberal 
concern for human rights, constitutionally protected, has traditionally existed in firm 
opposition to apartheid 'law and order'. Under apartheid ideology, racial groups replace 
individuals as the characteristic unit of self-determination and self-interest. Concern for 
non-interference in the life of exclusive cultural groups has overridden the liberal 
concern for the negative liberties and rights of individuals, which would counteract 
official interference in private lives. A needful respect for individual choice is evident in 
South African liberalism, compatible with minimalism but intimating a more fraternal 
bonding through a 'generosity of spirit' and 'an attempt to comprehend otherness' (in 
Alan Paton's words).63 
In 'unitary' democracy, the communitarian spirit which is lacking in thin liberal 
democracy is taken to an extreme. While thin liberal democracy gives rise to personal 
autonomy without participation, unitary democracy gives rise to communal authority 
without participation. A realist concern with power, law and control is evident, but in the 
service of a seemingly disembodied corporate voice or will. The reality of social 
differences is not used as the stimulus to creative relationship, but is eliminated in the 
cause of an authoritative unifying consensus. Democracy as a form of intersubjective 
relationship is displaced by a monolithic collectivism that breeds orthodoxy and 
homogeneity. Instead of autonomous1 interactive citizenship there is conformism to the 
collective will of an organic mass or frozen symbolic collectivity such as 'the people', 











government are endued with a stability and legitimacy that are not exposed to unsettling 
democratic processes. Democratic rhetoric is appropriated as a subterfuge, seeking to 
authorise an 'omnicompetent totalism' that fixes the positions of all citizens. Such 
rhetoric, giving voice to empirical absolutes, becomes - in Barber's uncharacteristically 
oratorical words -
a camouflage for the reintroduction of independent grounds, a stalking horse 
for Truth in the midst of politics, a Trojan Horse carrying Philosophers, 
Legislators and other seekers of Absolute Certainty into the very inner 
sanctum of democracy's citadel.64 
In a unitary 'democracy', mass integration dispels the exploratory-creative initiative of 
autonomous agents. Dissension becomes betrayal; and dialectical relationship is 
replaced by politics in 'the consensual mode'. A politics that is circumscribed by 
predeterminate cultural and ideological norms or by supposedly objective constraints 
(whether economic, ethnic, or any other) cannot, in Barber's view, also be the work of 
self-producing citizens. 
In South Mrica, elements of this unitarian dogmatism are apparent on the political 
right and, more ambiguously perhaps, on the left as well. The philosophy of Christian 
Nationalism clearly imports into politics the 'independent ground' of racial separatism, 
conscripting all citizens to its divisive scheme. This hitherto non-negotiable principle has 
wrought its omnicompetent totalism only too well in our collectively disparate social 
lives. Cultural diversity has been reified, to the detriment of truly 'public' interaction and 
reason, and has buttressed its claims to legitimacy by fixing the positions of all citizens 
within prespecified categories. Equally, democratic rhetoric on the left is marked at 
times by a disconcerting emphasis on mass unity and discipline. As has been noted, 
critical and creative openness are qualified by reference to the authoritative voice of 
symbolic collectivities. And where liberal approaches are concerned, it must also be 
acknowledged that the self-producing capacity of truly autonomous agents is as 
effectively undermined by self-willed atomism and apathy. Social fragmentation and 
self-enclosure can emasculate public talk just as efficiently as a monolithic. collectivism. 
(However, as will be argued in Chapter Four, the minimalist toleration of difference 
valuably suggests a necessary tactic of reticence on the part of teachers who wish to avoid 











Deliverance from the dangers of thin and unitary forms of quasi-democracy comes 
in the form of 'strong' democracy. This is communitarian but not totalitarian, involving 
everyone in a perpetual process of public talk, in the search for 'working maxims' 
appropriate to variable contextual needs. Adherence to pre-political truths and 
immutable principles contradicts the strong-democratic requirement of mutually 
responsive participation. This full participation manifests a civic and moral liberty that 
goes beyond the negative liberty of self-preoccupied individuals, to encompass the 
freedom of fraternal deliberation. It expresses a sense of obligation to, and sympathy for, 
others with whom a common destiny must be created. Strong democracy is not tied to a 
substantive belief-system but is a 'procedural conception', dedicated to a 'process' rather 
than to a definitive outcome. 'Democratic politics', Barber writes, 'is a form of human 
relations, and does not answer to the requirements of truth.'65 . This democratic 
relationship is essentially discursive, a form of symbolic interaction that 'makes and 
re-makes the world'. It is through talk that people come to be perceived as members of 
cultural groups or economic classes, and it is through talk that transformative 
perspectives and actions are fashioned. Political empowerment is therefore intrinsically 
a function of discursive participation. 
There is a problem, however: complete participatory self-government is held to be 
a mythic ideal; in reality there will always be disparities in communicative competence. 
Some will command discursive resources that others lack. The link between such 
discursive power and the distribution of cultural and material capital, as proposed by 
Marxist critics, raises challenging questions here; but even contending viewpoints in this 
regard are symbolically mediated, depending on their expressive reach to elicit an 
answering sympathy. In particular, disparities in self-productive and self-expressive 
power highlight the challenge of responsible leadership and education. 
The kinds of leadership most compatible with strong democratic ideals are what 
Barber terms 'transitional', 'facilitating' and 'moral' leadershipf!6 Where a democratically 
self-governing system is lacking, transitional leaders are to invent participatory 
institutions, and temporarily 'represent' the interests of the people whom they 'guide' to a 
state of independent self-government, before fading away. Facilitating leaders are 
required within existing participatory systems to help them work properly - guarding 
against the domination of an aggressive minority, for example. Such leaders are 
politically neuter, contributing to the efficacy of the democratic 'process' rather than to a 
substantive ideological cause. A more inspirational role is attributed by Barber to moral 











civility, mutuality, temperance, unselfishness, affection. Moral leaders, like transitional 
leaders, are 'self-liquidating', inspiring a will to pursue the good, yet without directing the 
course of that quest. The moral role is perverted when identified with a particular 
faction and its exclusive policies rather than with the co-operative virtues on which 
discursive relationship depends. Clearly the danger of covert manipulation exists; this 
will always be a threat to the cause of strong democracy. Also problematic is whether 
civic involvement in substantive issues can be successfully stimulated by non-partisan 
'procedural' functionaries. What people evidently require is socialization into the widest 
available range of pertinent discourses, the conflicting claims of which will open up 
liminal spaces in the participants' belief systems, which they themselves will be required 
collectively to reorientate and revise in the light of their respective perceptual fields. The 
educators' responsibilities, one infers, would be equally respectful of the learners' right to 
self-production, albeit in relation to the concepts and 'languages' that comprise the 
learning agenda. What is as important as the content of this agenda, therefore, will be 
reflexive awareness of its limits as a non-exhaustive construction. Accordingly, there is a 
sense in which 'agenda-setting' itself comprises the agenda of a participatory learning 
process; agenda-setting is to be a 'permanent function' of collaborative talk, and is not to 
be predetermined by elites.67 
There are apparent tensions in Barber's portrayal of strong democracy. There is 
the discomfiting implication that loyalty to the co-operative virtues is not compatible with 
commitment to a substantive policy option; or, put differently, that in a given context of 
struggle the interests of a particular political faction and of the strong-democratic process 
will not coincide sufficiently clearly to justify ideological advocacy by moral leaders or by 
teachers. There is also a tension in the description of strong democratic self-government 
as a 'never-ending' process of deliberation, decision and action. Ambiguity inheres in the 
requirements of 'action': if this action pertains to the community as a whole, then its 
efficacy as policy may well require active unity and cohesion, for pragmatic purposes. 
This suggests the need for discipline and authority consonant with the policy - as a 
product - resolved upon. Despite the preference for conditional 'working maxims' rather 
than positive 'truth', public talk clearly produces forms of relatively stable knowledge, to 
be 'applied' to a 'future realm of common action'.68 Given the fact that 'participation' 
only fulfils its potential in terms of the power to which it gives positive effect, the open 
'procedural' conception of democracy must evidently be compatible with substantive 
closure in particular contexts of need. This suggests a place for positivist methods that 
value the empirical explicitation of policy hypotheses, in publicly intelligible and 












practical intention of producing such mutually acceptable, explicit forms of relevant 
knowledge, the substantive effects of which may be democratically assessed. What makes 
this substantive public knowledge different from truth as an immutable product is its 
paradoxical 'grounding' in talk as open, unstable process. Policy decisions are thus 
legitimated through their respect for procedural preconditions that define a 'formal' 
openness. It is the mutual decentering signalled and engendered by this formal 
receptivity (ideologically non-normative but communicatively normative) that guarantees 
an ongoing dialectic between cultural authority and innovative autonomy. It is here that 
the private 'I' and the public 'we' work to decentre each other, as a prerequisite of 
legitimate decision-making. This presupposes, however, a populace_ that is discursively 
empowered and is both willing and able to participate in the process of democratic 
hypothesis-formation and evaluation. 
There still remains the difficulty of purposive moral leadership that is given to 
ideological advocacy in the interests of context-relative truth and justice, and in the 
longer-term interests of a democratic public sphere. In such cases moral leadership 
might coincide with transitional leadership, so that an educator, for example, might feel 
obliged to guide learners ideologically as a: precondition of longer-term self-government. 
The dangers of this have been touched on already, with reference to education as the 
inflexible purveyor of cultural authority and as the instrument of social policy. and with 
reference to the vulnerability of learners under conditions of radical cultural uncertainty. 
The potential coincidence of moral and transitional leadership, in the ostensible interests 
of strong democracy, is both a potential threat to autonomous participation and a 
plausible necessity. The conundrum originates, perhaps, in a degree of correspondence 
between subjects' categories of meaning and conventional structures of social practice. 
Thus personal meanings and ideological constructs come to be 'geared into the 
continuities of day-to-day life' (in Anthony Giddens's words).69 These habitual 
'continuities' do not necessarily delimit completely the discursive capacity of the 
individual agent; accordingly, by exposing social actors to alternative conceptualisations 
of social dynamics - that is, to competing discourses or symbolic systems - educative 
leaders place such actors in a position to reconsider the adequacy of customary limits and 
self-understandings, and to mobilise their own political counter-offensive, if need be, 
/ 
grounded in self-produced meaning rather than the dictates of social technicians or 
intellectual elites. This line of thought requires that transitional and/or moral leaders 
pursue their task primarily by assisting others to expand rather than to delimit their 
discursive-conceptual range as the prerequisite of self-generated communal change, and 












scope need not imply the abstraction of meaning from political struggle, and the insertion 
of thinking subjects as 'shifters' in an abstract text or code;70 rather, it implies their 
increased capacity for self-conscious insertion into continuities of interpretative struggle, 
within their own socially and discursively stratified political contexts. 
In South African education, for instance, the educative implications of 
strong-democratic ideals may be tentatively associated with liberalism in its supposedly 
more radical form, dedicated to a 'broad' oppositional alliance in the cause of a 
democratic culture in which citizens and learners engage themselves in the dialectic of 
interpretative struggle, within our fraught political terrain. People's Education is equally 
committed to democratic empowerment and critical autonomy, this being associated with 
programmatic material change. In both the liberal and People's Education perspectives, 
the conflation of moral and transitional leadership roles is indicated, with some 
continuity being envisaged between the substantive beliefs of the leadership and the 
counter hegemonic interests of the democratic majority. Whether education for 
liberation is compatible with education as an agent of programmatic struggle is a 
challenging question here, as is the correlation between conditions of material 
production and cultural or ideological production. As far as the educational vision of the 
National Party in South Africa is concerned, its unilateral commitment to racially 
separate educational systems and to 'group' self-determination is incompatible with the 
formal openness of anti-manipulative 'educating' (in Morrow's sense). It serves as a 
cautionary reminder of the undemocratic potential of socio-ideological 'technicism' in 
education, yoked to prespecified ground motives and substantive political designs. It 
gives urgent topicality to the question of how educative and political leadership can 
'assist' learners and citizens to see and think for themselves, without at the same time 
prejudicing their capacity for self-direction. 
Limits and transgression • the 'fluid edge' 
It is the danger of authoritative limits that prompts lohan Muller's neo-Nietzschean 
critique of the 'will to power' manifested by intellectuals via the 'will to truth'71. This 
power motive is not the less evident when self-criticism forms part of an ongoing project 
of rational progress, in his view. Muller's own critique of Enlightenment rationalism is 
deemed not to form part of this quest for clarified truth, however, positioned as it is at 












forging of rational certainty but 'doubt about the desirability of positive knowledge' and 
about 'the necessary benevolence of reason',72 Citing Michel Foucault (whom he 
supports, in opposition to Jiirgen Habermas), Muller avers the potentially 'terroristic' 
nature of positive knowledge, with its pretensions to 'universal grounding', in working 
against democratic autonomy and self-determination particularly when such 
knowledge is certified by an academic elite or even by its abstract credential of being 
'oppositional'. This reinforces a distinction between objective 'reason' and subjective 
'passion' (Habermas's· terms), with the implication that the former (appropriated by 
intellectuals) will take priority over the latter, imposing proper constraints on its 
undisciplined volitional power. In this way, the real politics of knowledge is displaced by 
a supposedly disinterested philosophical perspective that sets the objective limits of 
thought and action for others, whose relatively undisciplined impulses are thereby 
discredited and subjected to a higher cognitive authority. 
This argument applies equally to the 'dynastic' knowledge of a dominant regime of 
truth and to oppositional knowledge, in Muller's view, because 'power inheres in the 
form of knowledge and not in its ideological proclivities',73 What is needed is 'an 
alternative to the social role knowledge currently occupies in relation to power' - one 
that employs the founding scepticism of the Foucauldian perspective by going 'beyond 
necessary limitation to explore possible transgression'.74 In nurturing the impulse to 
transgress, the naive belief in rational 'perfectibility' should be eschewed, and 
intellectuals should 'curb any desire to lead'. Thus the field of social practice will be 
appropriated and redefined by the community and its organizations; the limiting 
conventions fixed by an ostensibly disinterested rational authority win thus give way to 
communal self-volition - firing the impulse to transgress inherited constraints - and 
decisive reconstruction, whereby limits are correspondingly revised. 
Muller makes some telling points concerning the dangers of a totalising discourse 
supposedly valorised by transcendent principles. The danger of premature closure from 
whatever quarter is indeed a real one. The need to destabilise systems 'grounded' in 
partisan interests masquerading as objective truth is particularly urgent in contexts of 
oppression. A target of Muller's critique is evidently the division between t~eory (which 
is linked with ahistorical reason, universal gro\lnding and positive knowledge) and 
practice (which is linked to historically contextualised political action, engaging the 
interest-relative frameworks of particular interpretative communities). By redressing the 
dualistic imbalance between the claims of objectivism over subjectivism, Muller seeks to 











impartial referee might presume to conjure necessary rules as the guardian of naturalised 
knowledge. Deference to such presumptive authority disempowers the democratic will in 
accordance with limits prescribed from above. The positive impulse to transgress 
officially sanctioned bounds in pursuit of more democratically supple forms of social 
justice is thus curbed by a customarily disciplined regard for received wisdom and 
normative constraints. Muller's proposed way out of this impasse is therefore to exercise 
a 'mature' approach to necessary limits (in the spirit of Foucault), accommodating and 
promoting the impulse to transgress, and acknowledging the coerciveness that inheres in 
the structural relation between knowledge and power rather than in expressed 
ideological loyalties. People will then not be tempted so readily into the role of duly 
edified, passive spectators of social policy, but will enter the ring as active contestants in 
the struggle for democratic justice. Muller's argument is directed, therefore, towards 
means of publicly accountable policy-formation, responsive to the need for ongoing 
criticism and reconstruction but in terms other than those of Enlightenment rationalism.7s 
The arguments of Brian Fay provide suggestive points of similarity and difference 
to those of Muller. Fay propounds a 'critical social science' that retains a rational and 
objective approach to the process of 'enlightenment, empowerment and emancipation' 
while at the same time recognising the transience and limitation of historical needs and 
perceptions.76 In arguing against utopian ideals that imply a goal of absolute completion, 
he seeks to supplement faith in emancipatory action with 'an ontology of tradition, 
embeddedness, historicity and embodiment'. The theories that result would be more 
modest in their hypothetical reach, aspiring not to universalising, permanent solutions 
but being instead 'self-consciously local, particular, situated, experimental and physical'.77 
The rational clarity this involves would be more fallible and partial, acknowledging the 
ambiguity, contingency and constraint associated with any human programme, yet also 
engaging social actors in continued and purposive collaboration. An unqualified faith in 
the power of progressive change to secure a perfect destiny is 'naive' and likely to end in 
'tyranny' - reminiscent of the hubris of the overreaching tragic hero; equally, though, an 
exaggerated sense of confinement and embeddedness is self-defeating and needlessly 
conservative. What is required is a balance between a realistic regard for limits and the 
revisionary power of the creative spirit: this 'ecological sense' (of balance) amends the 
critical enterprise so that it is 'both positive and negative, simultaneously opening and 












Fay's account of the difficult balancing act of a critical social science converges with 
Bowers' injunction concerning the desired balance between bonding and renewal, and 
also with Muller's advocacy of a 'fluid edge' between limitation and transgression. 
Muller's cautionary comment on the dynastic or terroristic potential of even 'oppositional 
knowledge' resembles Fay's sober recognition of the tyrannous tendencies of any 
over-idealistic regime of truth. Yet there is ambivalence in the arguments of both writers 
towards the claims of reason in its customary relation to the Enlightenment ideal of 
. efficient progress. Thus, although Muller distances himself from Habermas and Kant, 
and endorses neo-Nietzschean scepticism as opening up a 'space of no return at the limits 
of the Enlightenment project', he also declares the need 'to be very clear what we are for 
and against', and emphasises that he is 'certainly not against Enlightenment per se'.79 
And Fay, despite his cynicism regarding the possibility of perfection and claims to 
definitive truth, still strives to promote 'reflective clarity' by which people will be able 'to 
determine rationally and freely the nature and direction of their collective existence'. A 
critical social theory, in Fay's sense, still seeks 'to reveal to its audience its true nature in 
a scientific manner: this is what it means by enlightenment'.80 
The circumspection shown by Muller and Fay concerning the dangers of absolutism 
reflects a deep distrust of metaphysical ideals and non-ideological certainty. As this 
thesis will suggest, however, despite the dangers inherent in claims to perfect knowledge, 
the deconstructive function of a transgressive 'hermeneutic of suspicion' is valuably and 
necessarily supplemented by appeals to empirical facts and definitive truths. The 
negative, deconstructive moment is meaningful only in relation to the formative struggles 
of purposive, situated subjects, whose search for positive meaning and order correlates 
with the hope of a perfect enlargement of life, consonant with the will of one and all. 
However, in arguing for the continued value of claims to cognitive authority (whether 
empiricist or idealist), this thesis views the transgressive or liminal imagination as the 
ever-present impetus or occasion for the reciphering of discourse and of the constructs 
that give shape and substance to contextualised hypotheses and to established theory. 
This potentially destabilising source of open contestation is viewed, in a postmodern 
democracy, as the interminable prerequisite and corollary of any 'legitimate' public 
policy, subjecting it continually to the test of democratic reinscription and reconstruction. 
In arguing a case for the productive link between the radically transgressive, the 
hypothetically formative, and the conjecturally perfected moments, this thesis will 
examine the views of various critics of representational realism and reason, with the 
intention of showing their implicit reliance on both postmodern as well as positivist 












democracy. In pursuing this line of thought, the following chapter will examine in more 
detail the ostensible divide between the views of Jurgen Habermas, as.a defender of the 
project of 'modernity', and of Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard, as exponents 











cHAPTER lWO: MODERNI1Y VERSUS POSTMODERNI1Y? 
Modernity reaches back to changes in Western European thought in the seventeenth 
century, with the displacement of inherited cosmological and metaphysical assurances by 
increasingly self-reliant thinkers, whose questioning instituted the objectivist 
epistemology of scientific and liberal-humanist thought, oriented to the truth-serving 
powers of the autonomous reasoning subject.s1 In contrast to the premodern world-view 
in which knowledge, identity and structures of human relationship were fixed as the 
natural expression of a divinely ordained system, the modern world-view entailed an 
expanded and differentiated sense of human power, defining a capacity for independent 
enquiry and learning, for responsible interaction, and for self-fashioning and 
self-expression. This altered awareness of human capacity is reflected in the distinctions 
maintained by Kant and Weber (and subsequently by Habermas) between the cultural 
value-spheres of science, morality and art. Associated with the development of these 
distinct faculties was an orientation to the ideal of a composite truth, accessible to the 
disciplined mind in its experience of and reflection on the manifold realities of life. This 
tendency was fuelled by the Cartesian dualism of subject and object, by scientific 
empiricism, and by the Lockean notion of perception (as the mirroring in mind of an 
antecedent reality). These led to the foundational and representational habit of thought 
which is held responsible for the illusion that a natural order for the social world might 
be discovered which is as consistent and stable as that of the natural sciences. The 
philosophy of consciousness that underwrites this idealism entails the notion of a 
transcendental subjectivity, permitting the reflexive co-ordination and validation of 
perceived truths, en route to a vision of the composite whole. 
This philosophy of the subject in the 'Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian' tradition may be 
distinguished from the subsequent 'Hegelian' and 'Nietzschean' versions of epistemology 
(in Richard Rorty's terms).S2 The Hegelian view acknowledges the dependence of one's 
perceptual power on historical and social variables, and shifts the burden of rational 
validation from the partial powers of the self-reflective ego to an impersonal historical 
process directed towards the ultimate realisation of Absolute Spirit. This teleological 
thrust is readily assimilable to a faith in the cumulative acquisition of objective 
knowledge and its contribution to rational evolution, as expressed by proponents of 
progressive modernisation. By contrast, the Nietzschean attitude expresses the 
post modern impulse in its aversion fo~. any aspiration to absolute truth and for limits set 
in the service of totalising systems of belief or action. Claims to rational progress, 











signifying systems, ungroundable in any presuppositionless substrate. A correlative 
decentering of both the individual and society occurs: the identity between signifier and 
signified, which is presupposed by a correspondence theory of truth, is exposed as a 
metaphoric illusion; similarly, the confident contours of individual and social identity 
(which typify versions of both liberal-humanist and Marxist thought) are disrupted by the 
contingent contiguity of infinitely recombinable terms, the supposedly rational fixing of 
which in any 'authoritative' order may be achieved only at the cost of alternative 
revisionary possibilities. 
Whereas philosophy has traditionally sought to annex the transcendent terrain of a 
metaphysical vantage point, from which the perspectives of diverse value-spheres might 
be reflectively assessed and harmonised, the postmodem view eschews any belief in such 
normative authorisation. In Rorty's view, the post-Cartesian distinction between these 
cultural spheres of interest, and the metadiscursive claims of a transcendent 
philosophical Reason, have contributed to the assertions of exclusive areas of expertise, 
appropriate to different fields of knowledge. The domination of scientific thinking, as 
manifested in logical positivism, and its denigration of the non-physical realm as 
irrelevant to true knowledge, is an example of this presumptive intellectual authority; 
another instance is the rise to prominence of positivist sociology, and the domination of 
instrumental thought that typifies modern administrative bureaucracies. The underlying 
philosophical circumstances permit a distinction between the roles of the 'traditional' 
intellectual (in Corne lis Disco's terms), unattached to any single value-sphere (like 
Plato's philosopher, sensitive to universal Forms and Ideas), and those identified with 
one or another of the specific value-spheres and its associated interest groupS.B3 The 
'culture of critical discourse' of the 'traditional' Enlightenment intellectual may thus be 
distinguished from that of the more specialised intellectuals within the divisions 
categorised by Kant and Weber. The traditional culture of critical discourse is 
prominently retained by German philosophers of the Frankfurt School, Disco argues, but 
not by postmodem French philosophers, owing to earlier industrialisation in France with 
its promise of emancipation through social modernisation. There, the traditional 
intellectuals forsook their culture of philosophical detachment for the role of 'pacified' 
intellectuals, acquiescing in the development of cognitive-instrumental rati~nality in the 
ostensible interests of social improvement. Y ~t the turn away from metaphysics 
amounted to an inhibition of the critical potential of the Enlightenment. In Germany, 
the continued influence of philosophical idealism helped to preserve the promise of the 
larger culture of critical discourse as 'a public adjudicator of truth and morality'.84 By 











conserved a faith in universal reason, which the subsequent disillusionment with 
modernisation elsewhere caused to be equated with merely technical or instrumental 
rationality. Accordingly, the postmodern trend in France comes to express a radical 
scepticism that German critical theorists tend to refute; the classical ideals of order, 
consistency, identity and clarity that characterise the power of reason are displaced 
(under the influence of Nietzschean thOUght) by the refractory romanticism of a 
system-defying will-to-power, the expression of which constitutes its own integrity. It is 
the tension between these two trends that this chapter undertakes to explore, with 
reference to the opinions of Jiirgen Habermas, on the one hand, and of Michel Foucault 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard, on the other. 
Habermas 
While denouncing all totalising tendencies, Jiirgen Habermas nonetheless advocates a 
more 'comprehensive' concept of reason than is ascribed to Enlightenment thinkers by 
anti-rationalist critics of the enlightenment.85 In his opinion, Nietzsche's totalising 
critique of reason presupposes a 'reductive' view of reason as the agent of cognitive 
mastery and instrumental domination. Reason here serves an objectifying and 
manipulating role, reinforcing the subordination and separateness of that which is the 
object of attention. This 'exclusion model' severs subjective reason from nature: both the 
'outer nature' of the physical domain and the 'iImer nature' of the personal or 
psychological are thereby dominated and even repressed. By contrast, Habermas's 
communicative model is held to be 'inclusive', uniting the threads of outer nature (factual 
and propositional truth), inner nature (subjective experience and self-expression), and 
society (interpersonal relations and normative understanding). Instead of absolutising 
the authority of the rational subject, and constructing a false dichotomy between a 
controlling cognitive reason and its non-rational 'other', Habermas sees reason as a 
polymorphous meaning-giving faculty, concretely mediated with otherness in social 
practice. Otherness in this view indicates the occasion of differentially rational (rather 
than non-rational) meaning. The differential nature of rational meaning is reflected in 
differential validity claims appropriate to either propositional, normative, or 
aesthetic-expressive 'truth' - claims that are raised, and meaning that may be validated, 
only in the process of communication oriented to mutual understanding. 
Habermas joins with postmodermsts in decrying the tyranny of representational 
truth and the associated impact of objectivist epistemology on the operation of modern 











thought with Enlightenment rationality. The different cultural value-spheres of science, 
law and morality, and art are all articulated within reason, rather than being divided, as in 
the logical positivist scheme, between the rational (governing scientific knowledge) and 
the non-rational (things not subject to empirical proof). Accordingly, the distortions of 
the modern 'rationalised' state are attributable not to an excess of reason but to a 
'deficit'. The rectification of reason through the interpersonal medium of a 
communicative rationality that harnesses the mutually qualifying perspectives of the. 
different value spheres - is for Habermas fully consonant with modernity, being the 
expression of 'the counter-discourse' inherent in it and (contra Nietzsche) unleashing 'the 
subversive thought of modern thought itself against the paradigm of the philosophy of 
consciousness'. The one-dimensionality of logocentric thought tied to representational 
truth, cognitive-instrumental rationality and propositional statements is altogether 
reductive ontologically, epistemologically and semantically. Habermas therefore 
propounds a 'pragmatically expanded theory of meaning' that highlights not the primacy 
of propositional language per se but rather its communicative use as one distinctively 
human but not essentially privileged capacity.86 
Drawing on John Searle's theory of 'speech acts', Habermas moves the analytic 
focus of linguistic philosophy from the truth-conditions of simple assertoric statements to 
the entire spectrum of constative, regulative and expressive meaning. This expanded 
range of meaning is realised in interpersonal speech acts through the communicative 
testing of validity claims appropriate to the three value spheres and their predominant 
linguistic functions: the propositional (related to facts), illocutionary (oriented to the 
responses of interlocutors) and perlocutionary (oriented to a speaker's subjective 
intention). This expanded theory of meaning retains the connection between meaning 
and validity presupposed in truth-condition semantics, but alters the range of validity 
criteria to accommodate a broader conception of rational meaning. The world to which 
the rational subject relates is now no longer only that of objects but the more 
multi-dimensional 'lifeworld' uniting the objective, the social, and the subjective by 
means of communicatively mediated knowledge. This lifeworld is the ever-changing 
repository of and resource for meaning-patterns associated with factual understanding 
(for cognitive-instrumental truth), with normative social behaviour (for moral-practical 
action), and with subjective intention (the aesthetic-expressive dimension).87 These are 
all intermeshed, but are susceptible to clarifying discrimination, through the process of 











Accordingly, in his theory of communicative action, Habermas advocates 'the 
paradigm of mutual understanding' in opposition to the post-Cartesian 'paradigm of the 
philosophy of consciousness' with its attendant split between the knowing subject and the 
object of knowledge. By so doing, he wishes to avoid the vacillation between 
autonomous 'transcendental' and 'empirical' dimensions of understanding, replacing this 
dualism by intersubjective, communicative relationship that accommodates these 
previously contradictory 'self-themarizations' in modified form. Partners in a 
communicative relationship can never attain a completely transcendent perspective, 
commanding absolute knowledge, because of the ever-receding horizon of their 
'lifeworlds'. Participants oriented to communicative understanding may draw on the 
interpretative resources of their contextual lifeworlds so as to 'reconstruct' 
rule-knowledge pertaining to determinate situations (that is, 'empirical' knowledge of 
'specific totalities'); but for a larger universalizing view encompassing an the structures of 
a lifeworld or of all lifeworlds ('anonymous rule systems'), a 'theoretically-constituted 
perspective' is required, which co-exists with specific rule-knowledge as a provocation to 
creative and critical thought by historically situated communities. In the communicative 
relationship. then, empirical knowledge of specific totalities is enhanced by mutual 
methodical 'self-critique' and analysis of existing 'pre theoretical , knowledge; while the 
transcendental dimension of 'anonymous' (not specifically embodied) theoretical 
construction generates mutually provocative 'formal-pragmatic' postulations. sa This 
formal-pragmatic dimension is necessarily qualified and given particular substantive 
content by communicative action, which avoids the objectivating detachment and 
absolutist illusions of exclusive, subject-centred reason. 
The intersubjective testing of validity claims involves for Habermas a pragmatic 
logic of argumentation, and procedures that help communicative partners to redeem 
something of the r~tional potential that is built into the validity basis of all speech. It is 
only when the communicative structures of the lifeworld are subordinated to the reifying 
authority of purposive-instrumental cognition that the problems of a distorting and 
alienating 'modernization' arise, in which part dominates whole, and the reciprocal 
recognition of communicative understanding submits to usurpation and division by the 
objectifying consciousness. The distorting result of cognitive-instrumental domination 
reflects and perpetuates an 'entanglement' which marks our neglect of the necessary 
relation between the multi-dimensional lifeworld and communicative practice. A 
harmonious 'interlacing' can be regained only if plans for social action arise from a 
process of communication that allows for the interdependence of both the symbolic and 











In delineating the principles and procedures of rational argumentation, central to 
his theory of communicative action, Habermas rejects the idealism of a pure, 
non-situated reason (as wrongly imputed to his notion of an 'ideal speech situation' 
oriented to universal consensus). Such an abstraction would merely entrench the polarity 
of transcendental and empirical realms. There is no detached, absolutising reason; it is 
'by its very nature incarnated in contexts of communicative action and in structures of the 
lifeworld'. The purism of a self-sufficient rational ego is quite incompatible with meaning 
. that is communally constituted and intersubjectively validated. The decentering that 
occurs in such a dynamic mutuality contradicts the unity and certainty of a superior 
definitive perspective. Speech oriented to mutual understanding opens an interplay 
between 'alter' and 'ego' that engages self and other in a process of critical reflection, 
while also sustaining 'a networking of social interactions and lifeworld contexts'.89 
This paradigm of mutual understanding is more creatively radical, Habermas 
believes, than either Marxist 'praxis philosophy', or its phen,?menological corrective, or 
the linguistic turn of structuralist and post-structuralist thought.90 All of these 
alternatives retain the limitations of a subject/object dualism, he argues. By emphasisIng 
labour and the determining forces of production rather than the developing insights of 
critical-rational consciousness, Marxist philosophy became trapped in the depersonalising 
'fetters' of the objectifying 'production paradigm'; equally, the phenomenological 
counter-thrust reaffirmed the dualism by its emphasis on the penetrating power of 
subjective perception (despite such qualifying factors as temporality, situatedness and 
embodiment). Similarly, even the linguistic turn - in Habermas's overly negative 
interpretation - conceives of the subject either as the autonomous exploratory-creative 
user of language (as in aesthetic modernism, positing alternative structures of coherence 
and meaning); or the subject is viewed as the passive victim of the trans-subjective 
expanse of language, diffenlnce or power. 
The potential of communicative action depends, however, on the degree to which 
the communicative situation is untouched by coercion or domination, so that 
argumentation is governed by free and equal rational interaction. Despite the 
impossibility of realising an absolutely ideal speech situation given to the expression of 
pure reason, untainted by pre theoretical bias and interested motives, it is the reciprocal 
and necessary presupposition of argumentation that the conditions of an ideal speech 
situation are sufficiently met for consensus to be hypothetically attainable. These 










first, each participant must have an equal chance to initiate and to continue 
communication; second, each must have an equal chance to make assertions, 
recommendations, and explanations, and to challenge justifications. 
(The above constitute the 'symmetry conditions'.) 
Third, all must have equal chances as actors to express their wishes, feelings 
and intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act as if in contexts of action 
there is an equal distribution of chances 'to order and resist orders, to 
promise and to refuse, to be accountable for one's conduct and to demand 
accountability from others'.n 
38 
(These comprise the 'reciprocity conditions'.) All these conditions should obtain if 
participants are to aspire to mutual understanding that is based on the force of maximally 
unco~strained rational argument. There is a universal common interest in safeguarding 
these conditions, which serve to ground argument and consensus in a 'common form of 
life' that is not incompatible with the lifeworlds of the communicative partners. 
These lifeworlds exist as a substantive context that sets limits of its own to the 
formal efficacy of the presupposed ideal speech situation. What is preserved by the 
'universal pragmatics' of an ideal speech situation is not the inevitable certainty of 
authoritative consensus, but rather the continued prospect of an opening towards a 
yet-to-be-attained, even better, agreement. A creative tension is set up between the 
partial insight associated with 'specific totalities', and a yet-to-be-embodied 
comprehensive ideal - a tension that seems to guarantee for Habermas the continued 
possibility of going beyond existing agreements and institutionalised norms. His 
references to ideal possibilities do not indicate a complacent expectation of future 
finality, but are rather a necessary presupposition and stimulus of communication aimed 
at an as yet unrealised understanding. 
Critics of Habermas have stressed the totalitarian implications of the universal or 
transcendent 'moment' of validity claims. By contrast, it is argued here that this appetite 
for perfect inclusion should be understood as a co-implicate of the openness preserved by 
the elusive ideal speech situation. In the spirit of Muller's position, but contrary to his 
interpretation, the postulate of an ideal consensus is seen here as giving credence and 










Habermas on the validity claims arising from rational communication are highly 
significant: 
Of course, these validity claims have a Janus face: As claims, they transcend 
any local context; at the same time, they have to be raised here and now and 
be de facto recognized if they are going to bear the agreement of interaction 
participants that is needed for -effective participation. The transcendent 
moment . of universal validity bursts every provinciality asunder; the 
obligatory moment of accepted validity claims renders them carriers of a 
context-bound everyday practice. ... Hence, a moment of unconditionality 
is built into factual processes of mutual understanding - the validity laid 
claim to is distinguished from the social currency of a de facto established 
practice and yet serves it as the foundation of an existing consensus.92 
Habermas's reference elsewhere to the 'integrative' function of communicative 
rationality is misleading if the transgressive stimulus of the transcendental moment of 
validity claims is not given its due weight.93 The 'obligatory' moment, pertaining to 
contextualised consensus and social integration, is properly qualified and relativised -
made fallible in his scheme, by the speculative scope of the formal-pragmatic, 
'universal' dimension that is liable to burst 'every provinciality asunder'. It is the 
postulated 'unconditionality' entailed by the 'transcendent moment of universal validity' 
that makes perpetual place for the otherness which sustains the liminal imagination and 
the possibility of creative change. At the same time, however, the force of the appeal to a 
transcendent validity retains a residual power on the level of everyday practice, in respect 
of specific issues, after agreement has been reached. The danger lies in the facile 
identification of the 'obligatory' moment of accepted validity claims (which takes effect in 
context-relative, i~stitutional norms) with the perfection intimated by the original 
transcendent moment. A simple conflation of the obligatory and transcendental 
moments could constitute a reification (as in the case of Christian-National apartheid 
ideology), and so deny the function of the 'ideal' or 'universal' as a continued provocation 
to the revision of established beliefs and practices. What protects openness to change is 
the idea of something always beyond the given, generating a permanent dialectic between 
conditional knowing and unconditional possibility. There is no hierarchical separation 
between the ignorant and those in possession of the truth, in this scheme; alter and ego 
are called to the dynamic reciprocity of a 'common form of life', rooted in but reaching 











Communicative action therefore sustains a constant interplay of the locally consensual 
and expansively ideal, the conventionally formative and openly speculative. Universal or 
absolute truth is never fully realised, being intrinsically unconditioned and notionally 
formal, any consensus having local effects only, and contributing to the further 
embodiment of specific lifeworlds. The latter, with their never-wholly-objectifiable 
limits, nonetheless tend to constitute a 'conservative counterweight' to further dissent, in 
Habermas's view. They are comprised of intuitive self-understandings, body-centered 
complexes of experience, holistic cultural knowledge giving rise to internalised 
know-how rather than cognitive know-that.94 (Foucault's notion of social 'biopower' - to 
be discussed later - comes to mind here.) It is this solidary social practice, concrete 
micro-instances of power in action, that the procedural formality of an ideal speech 
situation is intended to expose to argumentation and possible change through a dialectic 
of the transcendent and obligatory dimensions, of the universal and provincial, the 
unembodied and the embodied. Despite the subversive and re-formative potential of 
communicative rationality, its participatory nature provides for social solidarity through 
mutual understanding, even as it subjects existent patterns of thought and conduct to 
innovative pressure. Even solitary, abstract thinking may come to share in the interplay of 
alter and ego, as a 'reflective' form of communicative action - that is, reproducing 
intersubjective relationship at the reflective level, so that self-relation and -reflection are 
mediated through the 'performative relation to an addressee' (in Habermas's terms).95 
This notion is consistent with Habermas's flexible conception of 'self-thematization' 
which is reconciled to both theoretical and practical reason - embracing the reflective 
reconstruction of 'anonymous' rule-systems, and the methodical critique of specific social 
totalities.96 The differential validity claims of the postulated cultural value spheres also 
accord with this model of a flexibly stratified and interwoven discursive realm, 
susceptible to the non-manipulative influence of a collaborative and democratically 
integrative, but unsettled (and potentially unsettling), communicative rationality. 
However, the equal reciprocity presupposed by communicative action might be 
travestied and repressed in specific contexts, as in South Africa, so curtailing the value 
(for both self and other) of the dialectically generative capacity of intersubjective 
discourse. In this way, the prevailing structures of the lifeworld are reinforced by 
institutional limits that restrict the concrete mediation of 'incarnated reason' with its 
'other', and deny the internal decentering that Habermas regards as intrinsic to modern 
reason. There is no single programmatic solution to the reification of a given empirical 
order; but by stressing the perpetual incongruity between the ideal and the 'real' - which 











the totalised truth-perspectives.97 This does not remove the danger that accompanies the 
attainment of any new order, the danger of further presumptive closure. The 
determining influence of provincial totalities poses a continual challenge to 
communicative rationality, engendering their own sense of achieved solidarity, which is 
not unambiguously open to the transgressive dynamic of a rectifying, counterhegemonic 
reason and to the alternative 'networking' of interactive lifeworld structures. 
It is this very danger of closure that justifies the role of communicative action as 
mediator of the critical function of traditional philosophy, in Habermas's view, serving to 
illuminate and interpret the lifeworld in its totality and to reopen the contact between the 
diverse dimensions of meaning and validity. In the guise of communicative rationality, 
this modern 'philosophy' sustains a pragmatic relationship with society, not only as an 
integrative force but also as a creative one, so that philosophical reflection serves as a 
medium or - in the account of Baynes et al - as a 'supplier (Zuarbeiter) of ideas that 
are treated as empirical hypotheses' and also 'as a stand-in for empirical theories with 
strong universalist claims'. The latter are relativised by this reflection, so that 'questions 
of "unity and universality" that might otherwise be closed or dropped' are held open. 
Similarly, this cross-cutting communicative 'philosophy' serves to 'open up the 
encapsulated spheres of science, morality and art' and feed them into the lifeworld as 
mutually interactive and provocative dimensions of communal experience and action.98 It 
is this dynamic interrelation which energises and defines what Habermas calls the 
'counterdiscourse of modernity', and which he wishes to redeem through the 'paradigm of 
mutual understanding', in the face of the reductive equation of the Enlightenment project 
with the limited paradigm of 'the philosophy of the subject'. 
'" '" '" 
Foucault 
Whereas Habennas's theory of communicative action expresses the centrality of relations 
of meaning amongst dialogic partners, Michel Foucault emphasises instead the relations 
of power that inhere in any claim to significant truth. In his view, any ~alidity claim 
implies a regime of truth, giving to discourse a political dimension that is merely 
disguised by an ostensibly neutral procedural ethic. A view of human relations as 
regulated by an impartial structure of communication belies the real locus of power that 
obtains in any social order. He refuses analyses which are 'couched in tenns of the 











relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics', so giving due weight to the 'open 
and hazardous reality of conflict'. Habennas's communicative model, he would claim, is 
a way of avoiding the 'violent, bloody and lethal character' of this reality, 'by reducing it 
to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue'.99 Foucault sees such dialogue as 
implying the interchange between autonomous subjectivities freely able to chart a way to 
enlightened clarity. What Foucault seeks to highlight rather is the subject's place within 
an historical framework and its associated, constitutive web of power, producing 'effects 
of truth' that it is not possible to distinguish from any deeper or more authentic 
foundation. 
The power that circulates within the social polity is not simply repressive (Foucault 
dismisses the distinction between ideology and truth); it is the substantive source of our 
self-understanding. It is positive, coaxing us into knowledge and experience, rather than 
merely negative like a forbidding set of objectifiable laws. A 'genealogy' of power can 
trace its effects - unlike the 'archaeological' emphasis of Foucault's earlier work, 
delineating the model of objectifiable laws or structures.1OO There is no sovereign source 
of the power relations dispersed throughout society. The 'biopower' Foucault describes 
is pervasive and unsystematizable; it is not co-ordinated by any arch-manipulator such as 
the state, or the economy, or history (these latter produce power effects of their own, but 
are not the locus of any pervasive causal logic). Power relations invest all areas of social 
reality - 'the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology ... ' - and 
possess an unpredictable dynamic that rules out the possibility of one grand solution. 
There are, he writes, as many different kinds of 'revolution' as there are 'possible 
subversive recodifications of power relations', in their different areas of manifestation. lOl 
Nonetheless, biopower is implicitly linked with the proce~s of 'normalization' that 
intimates but exceeds the monolithic power of the Law, and the Word, and the Text or 
Tradition in delimiting the nature and capacity of citizens in 'modem society', rendering 
them victims of procedures of objectification and subjection, surveillance, classification 
and distribution.102 This normalization is linked implicitly to the metaphoric notion of 
biopower as a pervasive conditioning force, directing the behaviour and relationships of 
the members of the social organism. Foucault likens the process of normalization to 
techniques of disciplinary training that make possible the 'meticulous control of the 
operations of the body', ensuring 'the constant subjection of its forces' and imposing on 
these operations 'a relation of docility-utility'. In this way our modern 'political anatomy' 
is realised, evincing a 'microphysics of power' and giving impetus to the 'utilitarian 











these processes of subject-constitution that are the focus of Foucault's genealogical 
micro narratives, highlighting the 'specific rationalities' of different fields. Power is not 
amenable to one-dimensional measurement; the norms it employs are specific to 
different rationalities and are more fluid than laws which are coded for less flexible, 
universal application. (This is reminiscent of the composite Habermasian 'lifeworld', as a 
dynamic compound of the various dimensions of modem reason.) Hence Foucault is not 
sympathetic to the measuring of overall social 'progress', as though the diverse 
micrologics of power could be accommodated to the comprehensive rationalisation of a 
single grand account. This might merely give credence to a dangerous 'immaturity' of 
thought, inspiring the projection of utopian visions with their associated ballast of 
normative prohibitions and obligations. 
However, Foucault does indeed acknowledge the presence of transient and local 
co-ordinating principles in specific contexts, which orientate relationships within and 
across different 'domains'. Such co-ordination is only ambiguously system-wide: it is 'not 
"-
uniform nor constant', and 'there is no general type of equilibrium between finalized 
activities, systems of communication, and power relations'; but there are what he calls 
'blocks' in which the various value domains 'constitute regulated and concerted systems' 
and are 'adjusted to one another according to considered formulae'.l04 Nonetheless, 
these definable instances of formative logic do not in Foucault's view justify adherence to 
a 'theory' that would claim to explain power in a global, totalising way. Hence his 
dismissal of the 'traditional intellectual' (as servant of the truth) and his alternative 
account of the 'specific intellectual', concerned with practical instances of power in 
specific sectors of social experience. This unites them with particular instances of 
concrete struggle, not with universal categories or general truth; nonetheless, a unity with 
the masses is liable to arise, owing to the likelihood of a common adversary - 'namely, 
the multi-national corporations, the judicial and police apparatuses, the property 
speculators, etc' .105 
There is seemingly a tension in Foucault's account between the role of systematic 
power liable to generate the unity that might justify a theoretical account, and the 
micro-effects of biopower in the lifeworlds of people in diverse sectors of society. The 
'savants' of small-scale milieux are now the specific intellectuals, replacing the would-be 
universal or traditional intellectual whose role was joined to a juridical faith in definitive 
general laws - in large conceptions of equity that may apply to all people everywhere. 











movements for justice or freedom, owing to the multiplicity of sites where micro-effects 
of power are unforeseeably experienced and contended against.106 Foucault again 
qualifies the impression that no theoretical account of large mechanisms of power in 
given societies is possible, by allowing that every society does have a 'general politics' of 
truth which orchestrates effects in the real world. The specificity of intellectual activity in 
this account simply means disavowing any pretension to speak for 'universal' truth; it is 
quite acceptable for specific intellectuals to clarify the 'general functioning of an 
apparatus of truth', or the values of a 'class position', or the 'conditions of life and work' . 
. It is equally acceptable for them to articulate the dominant social 'politics of truth' and to 
to 'operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential 
to -the structure and functioning of our society'. What distinguishes this intellectual role 
from the traditional conception is that the struggle is not undertaken in the interests of 
objective truth or a determinate knowledge-domain, but concerns rather the variable 
'rules according to which the true and the false are separated', and their attendant power 
effects. It is not a scientific enterprise, designed to conquer ideology, but a battle about 
the 'status of truth and the economic role it plays'.107 
Clearly there is room for potential misunderstanding in Foucault's references to a 
discernible rule-governed 'system'. What seems crucial is whether this systematic 
knowledge is inferred as static or fluid - as a 'juridical schematism' or a circulating 
'economy' of power. Foucault's rejection of the dialectical logic of contradictions in 
favour of genealogical 'relations of force' is evidently not intended to deny the possibility 
of systematic analysis amenable to a kind of theoretical formulation. What is at issue is 
the status accorded the positive theory: if deemed 'scientifically' true and (therefore) 
fixed and universal, like the deep structure of 'langue', Foucault decries it; if, on the 
contrary, it defines a social system' so as to highlight the political dynamic of its current 
regime of truth, th,is is acceptable - that is, if it is not done in the name of any reified 
order of truth. It is the constitutive effects of a particular political system that genealogy 
can discern: genealogy is 'a form of history which can account for the constitution of 
knowledges, discourses,. domains of objects, etc', without making reference to a 
transcendental subject.IOS Such constitution is not hierarchically logical, having instead 
micro-effects that allow for subversive recodifications in diverse milieux, without 
effecting or affecting a necessary comprehensive scheme. As previously noted, Foucault 
denies the attribution of power to any sovereign source. Yet there is a 'general regime of 
truth' that orchestrates the larger polity; and genealogical analysis should serve to 
ascertain 'the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth'.109 The question then, 











An important issue for democracy is the means of ascertaining a new general 
politics and of implementing the changes implied by it. This requires some way of 
engaging the views of diverse 'specific intellectuals' (potentially everyone) so as to secure 
their meaningful participation in this public policy fonnation. It remains to be seen 
whether a fonn of communicative action, as theorised by Habermas, is not the undefined 
mediator of any alternative politics of truth implied by genealogical analysis. Foucault 
writes: 
The problem is not changing people's consciousnesses - or what's in their 
heads - but the political economic, institutional regime of the production of 
truth. 
It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power 
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the 
power of truth from the fonTIS of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, 
within which it operates at the present time.110 
Habermas would agree with this acknowledgement of the fallibility of any system of 
knowledge, and would concede its power effects, but would direct attention to the 
procedure for ascertaining that the production of an alternative politics of truth is as free 
as possible of distorting power effects. It is here, at the nexus between old and new 
regimes, that his discourse ethics would seek a foothold, with due regard to the dialectic 
between lifeworld and system, and its effect on the hegemonic formation. 
Further ambiguity in Foucault's position, implying his actual c,?mpatibility with 
Habennas, is apparent in his article 'What is Enlightenment?'. Here Foucault reiterates 
his concern for the production of alternative regimes of truth, and locates in the 
'maturity' identified by Kant as a mark of Enlightenment thinking a willingness to 
question and disobey the authority of inherited constraints, with a view to defining 
conditions under which the use of reason can serve to justify new fonTIS of knowledge, 
action and aspiration. But what is significant for Foucault is not the advent of an 
enduring substitute, pennanently sanctioned by reason, but rather a critical 'attitude' that 
compels man 'to face the task of producing himself, without end. Enlightenment denotes 
for Foucault, therefore, the 'pennanent reactivation' of this attitude, a philosophical 
ethos giving expression to 'a permanent critique of our historical era'.lll He detaches this 
ethos from a facile 'humanism' - that. ·is, from a philosophy of the subject that implies the 
perfectibility of human understanding (as manifested in religious, scientific and political 











in rationally justified foundations, Foucault recommends the use of reason to identify 
areas of contingency and singularity that are not accommodated to the limits of existing 
social designs or conventional beliefs. The possibility of transgression this incongruity 
suggests is made clearer by way of genealogical analysis, linking the form of what we are 
to the discursive dynamics that select and occlude contingent options. Such analysis, 
accordingly, 'will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think'.112 
The ambiguity consists in the corollary formative thrust of such transgressive 
critique. Here, the critical attitude of transgression is replaced by a more constructive 
moment (albeit an 'experimental' one), in terms of which the work done at the limits of 
ourselves 'is put to the test of reality' in order to specify the points 'where change is 
possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this cbange should take'.113 
This constructive moment does not authorise the change as permanent or global, 
however. Owing to the inevitable limits on our knowledge and awareness, and to our 
historicity, we are 'always in the position of beginning again'. But the lack of a 
transcendent perspective does not entail a radical relativism or incoherence: 'The work in 
question has its own generality, its systematicity, its homogeneity and its stakes.'114 This 
productive coherence is to be understood always to be a 'historical figure' that refuses 
claims to permanent validation. What Foucault advocates is a 'critical ontology of 
ourselves' that is an attitude as opposed to 'a theory, a doctrine ... a permanent body of 
knowledge that is accumulating'. Nonetheless, he does claim for such a critique a 
theoretical coherence', but this IS confined to the genealogically-prompted 
problematisation of the historical forms of biopower that have constituted us as subjects. 
The reconstructive 'experiment', whereby 'historico-critical reflection' is put to 'the test of 
concrete practices', is assigned to the category of 'practical coherence'.us What is lacking, 
it seems, is a means of accounting for the step between theoretical and practical 
coherence, between genealogical analysis/critique and experimental testing. Here, 
again, one must allow a possible mediating role for Habermas's communicative action, 
without assuming that the rational discourse it bespeaks or the validity claims it strives to 
redeem entail the dogmatic fixing of limits as universal or permanent. 
Foucault's appeal for continual experimental testing implies that social policies 
must remain in the realm of open hypotheses. Proof or verification as the outcome of 
such testing would involve the construction of affirmative theoretical norms, something 
from which he ambiguously distances himself. (The 'theoretical coherence' referred to 











experimental attitude as 'prudent' and 'demanding': 'at every moment, step by step, one 
must confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, with what one is.'1l6 
This critical alertness seemingly cuts across the division between theory and practice, in 
his view. Instead of 'applying' ideas (seen as the constituents of a prior theory), Foucault 
sees 'testing' them as displaying a more immediate interfusion of action and thought, of 
the lifeworld and the structuring initiative. He thus intends to substitute the dynamism of 
interactive forces for the disciplining guidance of reified abstractions. Yet there is a 
manifest tension in Foucault's remarks on the implicit role of theory in any purposeful 
. social intervention. The matter is not resolved by restricting programmatic, intentional 
action to the microlevel - to the multiple spheres of specific intellectuals. Foucault 
himself disavows any prior allegiance to the principles of an integrated political theory: 
, . .. the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a pre-established political 
outlook and do not tend toward the realization of some definite political project'.ll7 Such 
allegiance would entail a 'totalizing' impulse that would negate the critical attitude that 
should open up rather than foreclose on unplanned perspectives. He espouses instead an 
ethical interest that is freely responsive to concrete problems, not for the sake of some 
grand scheme but for the sake of unpredictable moral and historical practice. Yet 
Foucault also allows that this ethical attitude is compatible with political purposes, 
obliging those who govern to be analytically attentive to the implications of action taken 
in any social context. This appears to grant that such moral action is consistent with an 
implicit theory which is brought to explicitness in the political sphere; the reality of 
guiding principles is not effaced by the translation of purposive social action into the 
language of a moral rather than political discourse. 
At the same time, Foucault expresses apparent sympathy for a Habermasian 
discourse ethic as a 'critical principle' - that is, oriented not so much to maintaining an 
existing social consensus as to exposing the non-consensus inhering in existing power 
relations, with a view to overcoming it. He explicitly refutes the idea that such a critical 
principle has a 'regulatory' function dedicated to conserving an existing state of affairs, 
associated with a previous consensus. 'The farthest I would go is to say that perhaps one 
must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.'1l8 This attitude 
chimes with the 'maturity' he feels the Enlightenment promised, but which has not yet 
come about a willingness to criticise conventional constraints that presume to 
safeguard the interests of all. 'Obedient' respect for a supposed consensus thus gives way 
to a more subversive, re-creative spirit. Again, the line between transgressive critique 
and reconstructive 'regulation' is an evanescent thing, serving perhaps as a purely formal 











by specific interpretative communities. An equitable way of defining such collective 
meaning, through a process of communicative action oriented to mutual understanding, 
remains a largely tacit dimension of Foucault's political ethics. 
The value of communicative 'regulation' is brought to the fore, however, by 
Foucault's denigration of 'polemics' as opposed to 'dialogue'. The sceptical assailing of 
accepted limits, which he associates with 'maturity', is clearly contrasted to (although 
suggestive of) a polemicism that is not self-critical as well. In dismissing the view that 
polemicists can 'validate' their opinions by waging 'war' on an adversary who is 
demonised from the outset, Foucault recognises the need for another communicative 
means of seeking such validation. This is found in the 'dialogue situation': in 'the serious 
play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation', the exercising and 
respect of participants' 'rights' - for instance, the right 'to remain unconvinced, to 
perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, 
to point out faulty reasoning, etc'.119 Such an interchange is likened to a 'game' in which 
interiocutors adhere to certain rules, appertaining to their mutual rights. Foucault's 
conception here is clearly suggestive of the qualities that characterise Habermas's ideal 
speech situation as a regulatory principle of his discourse ethics. For Foucault the critical 
impulse to 'transgress' obviously does not extend to the impartial norms of the dialogue 
situation described by him, as that would be incompatible with the requisite 
'truth'-seeking partnership (the polemicist's addressee is not seen as 'a partner in the 
search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong .. :, in Foucault's words).120 It 
is the polemicist who is seen as immature, adhering unreflectively to prior inviolate 
convictions and a superior consensus that sparks a militant self-assertion. 
However, it appears that Foucault's distinction between polemics and dialogue is 
not developed primarily to argue for a more mature form of validation as such. It is to 
pursue the theme of continued openness as opposed to closure, the need for ongoing 
critique rather than a dialogically-derived consensus. Accordingly, his own approach to 
political questions is not marked by a sense of party-political alliance, or by a methodical 
search for the one valid 'solution'. Rather, it is of the order of 'problematization', a 
posing of questions that no 'political formula' can answer completely. He sees a truly 
dialogic, problematizing attitude as viewing politics from the outside - from a position 











... the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place 
oneself within a 'we' in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the 
values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future 
formation of a 'we' possible by elaborating the question. l21 
49 
Here again one is confronted by a seeming aporia concerning the fruits of dialogue that 
eventuates in consensus: one is prompted to ask what criteria accord credibility to the 
outcome of dialogic discussion, as opposed to the validation proclaimed by the 
polemicist. What norms pertain to the formation of a future 'we', what self-generative 
bonds of common purpose? One infers that the condition of openness preserved by the 
dialogue situation is also a prerequisite of democratic justice and valid. representation. 
Open dialogue constitutes a formally normative yet substantively non-prescriptive 
principle that gives conditional justification or validity to decisions reached through 
maximally inclusive processes of democratic communication. 
Foucault also approximates an endorsement of the Kantian-Weberian distinction 
between cultural value spheres, on which Habermas develops his account of modern 
reason. Foucault expresses his interest in the 'relations among science, politics and 
ethics', for example, with a bearing on the formation of 'a scientific domain, a political 
structure, a moral practice'. Genealogical analysis is directed at fields of experience in 
which 'the three fundamental elements of any experience are implicated: a game of truth, 
relations of power, and forms of relation to oneself and to others'.lll Foucault then 
distinguishes further between the attitudes associated with such experience, and the work 
of 'thought' as a relatively detached, objectifying (but still problematizing) agency: 
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it meaning; rather, 
it is what al~ows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to 
present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as- to its meaning, 
its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one 
does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an 
object, and reflects on it as a problem.123 
This characterisation of the work of 'thought' tantalisingly recalls a critique of pure 
reason, and a transcendent subjectivity that might validate the ungrounded claims of 
practical reason. However, Foucault stresses that such thought is not exercised in the 











to itself; nor is such thought shaped to or governed by a natural propensity for a single, 
right solution; rather, 'it is an original or specific response - often taking many forms, 
sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects - to these difficulties, which are 
defined for it by a situation or a context'.l24 
The implication would seem to be that participants in a dialogue situation (like 
genealogical analysts in respect of history) may engage in thought that reflects on the 
conditioning factors of divergent responses, on the pre theoretical 'elements' that make 
possible different kinds of problematization, relevant to specific issues. This would 
clarify the 'postulates or principles' of the diverse responses, which might then be 
susceptible to modification in keeping with a new problematization that intimates a more 
mutually acceptable 'solution'.l25 Where the validity-status of proposed solutions is 
concerned, one infers (in keeping with the general tenor of Foucault's arguments) that 
any consensual outcome does not command the status of theoretical certainty, however 
salutary the 'experimental' behaviour of the relevant field of experience may prove to be. 
Stable definition is anathema to the critical thrust of self-reflective, dialogic thought: 
problematization is not oriented to 'an arrangement of representations' (that is, to static, 
fixed constructs) but is something fluid, responsive to historical contingency. Foucault's 
caution concerning the dominating potential of large-scale co-ordinating principles is 
consistent with his wish to avoid the disciplinary habit that would tend to impose a 
monologic interpretation of power or order on any society, either as a substitute for 
detailed analytic critique or as a revisionary but reified ideal. The hypothetical 
generalisation, which tempts the imposition of tyrannical rule, is thus replaced by an 
acute sensitivity to the more nuanced particularities of experience. This is the reason for 
his genealogical focus on the 'how' of power instead of on the 'what' or 'why'. This 
micro-analysis accounts for the difficulty Foucault has in reconciling himself to any 
manifesto or set of politically formative ideals amenable to reasoned debate, critique and 
consensus, and to the programmatic constitution of a future co-ordinated regime. Any 
social narrative cohering around a set of rationalised abstractions invites the construction 
of parameters to be respected, rather than the properly cautious, experimental attitude of 
modernity. He writes: 
To put it bluntly, I would say that to begin the analysis with a 'how' is to 
suggest that power as such does not exist. At the very least it is to ask 
oneself what contents one has in mind when using this all-embracing and 
reifying term; it is to suspect that an extremely complex configuration of 










question: What is power? and Where does it come from? The little 
. question, What happens, although flat and empirical, once it is scrutinized is 
seen to avoid accusing a metaphysics or an ontology of power of being 
fraudulent; rather it attempts a critical investigation into the thematics of 
power. l26 
51 
Such a critical ontology, it appears, is not necessarily the prerogative of an enlightened 
few. Although power relations are 'rooted deep in the social nexus', they are not seen by 
Foucault as constituting an irresistible monolithic imperative but as a simplified 
structuring of 'the possible field of action' - a field within which a degree of autonomous 
choice is possible, reflecting the 'recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of 
freedom'. This implies that the hegemonic order is not wholly determinative, nor is the 
freedom absolute: 'it would be better to speak of an "agonism" - of a relationship which 
is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation 
which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.'127 This 'agonism', then, arises 
from the tension between disciplinary forces and an insubordinate residuum that is the 
occasion of possible reversal and ongoing transformation. It is evidently the source of the 
critical animus of 'thought', as previously discussed, which sustains and is sustained by 
communal dialogue and creative struggle. 
Lyotard 
As Fredric Jameson notes in his foreword to Jean-Francois Lyotard's The Postmodem 
Condition, Lyotard's discussion presents a critique of Habermas's 'vision of a "noise-free", 
transparent, fully communicational society'.l28 In this respect, Foucault and Lyotard are 
in apparent sympathy, although as I shall continue to argue, they have more in common 
with Habermas than is perhaps usually recognised. For Lyotard, 'postmodern' designates 
the present state of culture and the 'condition of knowledge' (viewed as a 'crisis of 
narratives') in the most highly developed societies - a crisis marked by transformations 
in the 'game rules' for science, literature and the arts. More specific~lly, Lyotard 
conceives of this change as altering the status ,of claims to true knowledge, claims 
depending either on the metadiscursive legitimation associated with grand philosophical 
narratives, or on the pure objectivity sought by science. Lyotard conceives of the 
'modern' as typified by such strivings for certain knowledge and scientific truth; whereas 











efforts depend.129 He is sceptical whether legitimation in the postmodern condition may 
now be found 'in consensus obtained through discussion, as Jurgen Habennas thinks'; 
and he adds -
Such consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And 
invention is always borne of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not 
simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not 
the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy.l30 
Lyotard develops his argument byway of reference to Wittgenstein's notion of 'language 
games', which occur in specific domains of discourse and are governed by conventional 
rules requiring no ultimate philosophical defence. These rules are activated merely as 
pragmatic constraints on players in the 'games', whose more or less voluntary 
participation and respective 'moves' are rendered intelligible in terms of the options 
permitted by the rules. Both the legitimating claims of a discourse oriented to true or 
objective knowledge, such as science, and the legitimating claims of a discourse oriented 
to true justice or freedom, such as critical social theory, are ostensibly deluded by the 
idea that there is a determinable transition between true and false, when really there is 
only a transition between acceptance or non-acceptance of the codes and conventions of 
different games, distinguishable by no truth-bearing standard. Further, social beings are 
not trapped within anyone game, but may move at will from the governance of one to 
that of another. 
The range of movement created or permitted within games, and of choice between 
alternative games, justifies a view of communication as a dynamic struggle for discursive 
power: 'to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain 
of a general agonistics.'l31 This idea of agonistics is not meant to suggest only a 
destabilising tension; rather, the social fabric itself largely relies upon and helps to make 
possible the diverse 'moves' within and between its constituent language games. Lyotard 
argues for a distinction between this agonistics, which calls for continual mobility in any 
social interaction, and the more static model of communication as an exchange of 
pre-packed definitive messages between sender and receiver. He also rejects 
emphatically the oppositional thinking that views messages as making claims about 
determinate referents that are either true or false. Although any language game may 
well become institutionalised as dominant, so that its rules come to define the limits of 











contrary moves and games indicates - as In Foucault's account a freedom of 
interactive engagement within the variegated social 'network'. Thus interlocutors are 
always involved in 'pragmatic relationships', while also being 'displaced by the messages 
that traverse them, in perpetual motion', giving rise to unexpected, disorienting and 
destabilising counter-moves that evade easy systematisation.l32 Despite his stress on 
flexibility and unpredictability, it is clear that Lyotard regards an agonistics as compatible 
with the presence of 'rules' governing relationships between participants. Such rules do 
not foreordain the trajectory of all 'moves' in the social process, although the various 
possibilities of movement are presumably interpreted in keeping with a set of 
conventions required for mutual intelligibility. 
Lyotard associates this agonistic relativism with the flexible constitution of cultural 
norms across the several value spheres acknowledged by Habermas and Foucault as well. 
This knowledge entails a 'competence' that is concerned not only with the criteria of 
cognitive truth but includes the criteria of 'justice and/or happiness' and of 'beauty'. 
Accordingly, cognitive knowledge of the 'true' is supplemented by customary knowledge 
of the 'good' - this knowledge 'is what constitutes the culture of a people'P3 More 
significantly for the development of his argument, Lyotard identifies such customary or 
cultural knowledge with 'narration' which provides inunediate legitimation to its 
collective audience. This is held to differ from a concern for 'noise-free' legitimation 
attributed to Habermas. The classical epic, for example, served a socially cohesive role 
by portraying in narrative form the quests and successes of heroic figures, exemplars of 
valued qualities that are reaffirmed in the telling - the narrator, audience and characters 
being united in their identification with the narrative experience. Such popular narrative 
knowledge is self-validating and of inunediate social and personal significance: it 'does 
not give priority to the question of its own legitimation' and 'it certifies itself in the 
pragmatics of its own transmission without having recourse ,to argumentation and 
proof.134 It is not itself 'developmental'; nor is it 'expert' knowledge. All are joined in its 
activation of significant relationships which reaffirm its import rather than contributing to 
a rationally evolving process. 
Lyotard claims that the rise of the post-empiricist philosophy of science in recent 
times marks a loss of faith in the possibility of value-free, objective, non-narrative 
knowledge. Science is recognised as being subject to non-absolute discursive criteria, as 
being governed by presuppositions which determine the conventional rules of the game. 
But Lyotard highlights the concurrent rise of the language game of 'legitimacy', which 











narrative of emancipation, denotative knowledge is viewed as a cognitive 'means' to a 
political or moral 'end' reflecting freedom and justice, which is prescribed and validated 
by the unitary will of 'the people' (the 'practical subject' of knowledge). Here there is no 
synthesizing metadiscourse that inevitably subsumes means to end, however; the 
cognitive and the moral or political spheres are distinguishable, This distinctiveness may 
serve a critical function: for instance, scientists can refuse to collaborate with the wilful 
'prescriptions' of a political programme. In the narrative of speculation, by contrast, 
principles of cognitive knowledge are synthesized with ethical ideals, in a grand 
philosophical system. Neither of these grand narratives is able to ground itself any more 
. than science is able to do, in Lyotard's opinion; indeed, their de legitimation has been 
hastened by the futile 'game of legitimacy' itself, which has only revealed its arbitrating 
limits to be set by conventions of no surer validity or relevance than any other optional 
language game or contract. 
Where does this leave the seeker of order and progress? As Lyotard writes, 'The 
social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of language games', and 
'nobody speaks aU of those languages' - they have no universal 'metalanguage'. In the 
postmodern world, however, there is no nostalgia for the loss of the grand narrative. 
What 'saves' the inhabitants of this world is the 'knowledge that legitimation can only 
spring from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction' ,136 On this 
note, Lyotard implies that the only source of legitimacy is the particular narratives 
constructed through ongoing discursive interaction that is the flexible legitimising 
medium of both social solidarity and social reconstruction. What is yet to be made clear 
is how this mobilisation of responsive narrative know-how may be fairly reconciled with 
the directive and stabilising influence of existing popular 'prescriptions', with due regard 
for conditions that secure truly democratic participation and accountable representation. 
In this regard, Lyotard poses questions for what he calls 'social pragmatics', in the 
light of the 'narrative pragmatics' of postmodem science. Instead of seeking ultimate 
coherence, identity and consistency the narrative pragmatics of postmodern science 
accepts the impossibility of a universal metalanguage, and instead conducts its activity as 
'paralogy' and finds its justification in the de stabilising and 'remounting' of its languages 
of internal communication. Such scientific practice is attuned to 'fracta', to areas of 
indeterminacy, to 'undecipherables', and it constantly seeks 'new stories' and little 
narratives, locally-determined rules and norms, creative 'moves' in the pragmatics of 
knowledge, This paralogical narrative culture does not aspire to wider consensus but to 











moves that elicit unpredictable counter-moves. It is a 'differential' and 'imaginative' 
enterprise, challenging homeostasis, homogeneity, and the 'terroristic' elimination of 
otherness that is implied by ultimate commensurability. Science now accepts a plurality 
of formal and axiomatic systems, regarding this not as cause for alarm but as the 
opportunity for perpetual 'morphogenesis'.m 
In this spirit of radical creativity and plurality, the grand claims of emancipatory 
discourse and systematic philosophy are seen as a threat to freedom. Habermasian 
communication is unexceptionable in its opposition to the tyranny of technocratic 
systems, but the 'regularisation' of moves and faith in rational progress through consensus 
are misdirected, in Lyotard's view, giving delusive credence to the prospect of a future 
metaprescriptive homogeneity. Indeed, compared to the pluralist narrative pragmatics of 
postmodern science, social pragmatics is even less amenable to isomorphic resolution 
than is possible in scientific discourse. The network of social language games is 
irreducibly 'heteromorphous'. Lyotard writes: 
There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine 
metaprescriptives common to aU of these language games or that a revisable 
consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific 
community could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions regulating the 
totality of statements circulating in the social collectivity. 
For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow 
Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the 
direction of a search for universal consensus through what he calls Diskurs, 
in other words, a dialogue of argumentation.l38 
The alternative is to regard potential consensus as being not an end but, as m 
postmodern science, a 'state of discussion' that finds its only validation as part of a larger 
'quest for paralogy'.. Lyotard thus reverses the traditional view of the search for 
knowledge and justice, seeing the exploration of new possibilities as the never-finished 
object of the quest, rather than the attainment of a perfect goal. Accordingly, social 
justice should not be linked to the achievement of stable consensus, which has become a 
'suspect value', but to the micro-contextual instancing of 'temporary contracts' which are 












Clearly, there is reason to construe Lyotard's disquisition as promoting continual 
opeIUless, in contrast to the repression and seduction associated with modern systems of 
social authority. There is much to recommend in his denunciation of the fixating and 
regularising power of totalising orders, given to the efficient 'mercantiIisation' of 
knowledge in a modern, 'rationalised' world. However, it is arguable that his 
endorsement of narrative plurality entails an overly negative view of the pragmatic role 
of consensus in the pursuit of a just public policy. Lyotard does not in fact regard 
consensus as inherently oppressive; he does see its enabling value as the prerequisite of 
any contract - however temporary, finite or locaL If such contracts (which imply a 
degree of conditional 'closure') are to be formed, as the basis of mutual intelligibility and 
of further ventures in destabilising and 'remounting' various languages, there would seem 
to be a need to attend to factors that might prejudice any initial working consensus, 
however provisional it may be. What Lyotard does not address is a means of defence 
against the possible intrusion into a 'state of discussion' of inequitable relations between 
participants, which reflect and perpetuate an imbalance in participatory power. His 
assumption appears to be that participants in language games are all equally and funy 
cognisant of their rights, and are able to exercise them, in terms of the rules of their 
narrative game - even if such rights define a freedom to transgress. Dissension can be 
as terroristically domineering as convergence, in practical effect, if participants are not 
equally adept at differential self-assertion. (The negative effect of thin-liberal 
'anarchism' on Barber's strong-democratic 'talk' comes to mind here. The role of 
'facilitating' leaders in protecting reticent members from more aggressively voluble ones 
is equally to the point, whatever the merits of their respective 'causes' might be.) A 
related difficulty is noted by Lyotard but glossed over in celebration of 'ambiguity': this 
pertains to the compatibility of multiple temporary contracts with the culture of late 
capitalism, characterised by a consumer-oriented commodification of diverse 
perspectives and by their correspondingly rapid obsolescence. 
The last point is highlighted by Jameson in his introduction to Lyotard's The 
Postmodem Condition. Jameson links postmodern plurality to the 'dynamic of perpetual 
change' identified by Marx as immanent in capitalist production. He also links Lyotard's 
conception with an aesthetic that is 'closely related to the traditional ideol.ogies of high 
modernism'; but this celebratory capacity for reconstructive change is divorced from the 
'telos' traditionally associated with narrative, implying the impossibility of anything 
'beyond capitalism' that could legitimate a political struggle for a 'radically different 
future'. Jameson therefore rejects the indiscriminate denunciation of all 'totalizing' 











of rationalised claims to truth. 140 In the end, Jameson appears to regard the 'pleasures 
of paralogism' as being politically ineffectual, in the absence of a more sustained and 
purposive affirmation of a large-scale programme of action. The latter requires 
rationalised commitment to a collective metanarrative, attuned to objective needs and to 
the silC?nt ideological terrorism of the political unconscious which mystifies one's relation 
to the real conditions of life. 
Both Jameson and Habermas would endorse Lyotard's caution regarding the 
. dangers of unreflective dogmatism; but they would not wish to discredit in advance the 
prospect of a mutuality that is self-critical yet expressive of a greater degree of purposive 
solidarity than Lyotard's radical decentering appears to allow. It would be wrong to view 
Habermas, particularly. as being the blind devotee of an all-devouri"ng metaphysics of 
truth. The universal pragmatics of communicative action has much in common with 
Lyotard's depiction of the narrative pragmatics of science. It is not misleading to see a 
recognition of narrative diversity as a necessary and integral dimension of Habermas's 
discourse ethics, as formally represented and preserved by the postulated 'ideal speech 
situation'. Of significance, in this connection, is Habermas's account of the relation of 
philosophy to 'the reconstructive sciences', the aim of which is to reveal the hidden 
presuppositions of any scientific or social competence. It does not aim to demonstrate an 
all-inclusive homogenising 'grammar' or 'deep structure'; on the contrary, it aims to 'yield 
knowledge that is not necessary but hypothetical, not a priori but empirical, not certain 
but fallible' (as Baynes et al explain), while at the same time assuming that such 
knowledge will elicit agreement.141 In this process, philosophy functions to reveal rather 
than to efface the specific narrative presuppositions of any explanatory account. This 
process of rational self-reflection accordingly serves not to hasten the premature 
assertion of a general truth but the very opposite: philosophy functions as a 'Platzhalter' 
or placemarker, holding in abeyance any final judgement. It works to hold open 
questions of 'unity and universality', while serving a constructive critical function as the 
source of ideas that might be treated as creative hypotheses. for which decisive empirical 
evidence is yet to be found. These hypotheses are taken to share the 'universal' 
presupposition of communicative action, namely that a claim to validity might be 
redeemed through the agreement sought by force of argument. It is in this sense that the 
reconstructive sciences (and similarly Lyotard's own rhetorical account of the narrative 
basis of social and scientific knowledge) may be said to raise 'universal - though 











It could also be argued that Lyotard, in generalising his account of narrative to 
include the social as well as scientific realms (with appropriate discrimination), evinces 
the kind of communicative rationality that Habermas associates with the role of modern 
philosophy. It offers a relatively comprehensive perspective from which the modem 
imbalance between different value spheres may be subjected to enlightening scrutiny and 
mutual decentering, in the interests of a more humane relationship between the 
cognitive, the moral-practical, and the aesthetic-expressive dimensions of the lifeworld. 
As Habermas writes: 
Reaching understanding in the lifeworld requires a cultural tradition that 
ranges across the whole spectrum, not just the fruits of· science and 
technology. As far as philosophy is concerned, it might do well to refurbish 
its link with the totality by taking on the role of interpreter on behalf of the 
lifeworld. It might then be able to help set in motion the interplay between 
the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive 
dimensions that has come to a standstill today, like a tangled mobile.143 
Despite his support for a fuller perspective on the 'totality' (an ever-dangerous 
aspiration), Habermas's project is clearly not that of an authoritarian consciousness, or a 
belief in an ultimate static order. It is the very antithesis: not to authorise the 
string-pulling of a master puppeteer, but to generate freely interactive motion; not to 
freeze the filaments in a silent or single-patterned structure, but to stimulate an 
ever-fluid, largely unpredictable - though not unintelligible - movement of diverse 
connected parts. His emphasis is on liberation into communal participation and 
communication, rather than final arbitration. Communicative rationality is the catalyst 
that activates the unsettling hope of mutual understanding; it facilitates transitions 
between, and new developments amongst, the diverse language games that Lyotard is 
anxious to preserve as agents of postmodern paralogy. It is in this sense that Habermas 
writes that 'a philosophy starting from formal pragmatics preserves the possibility of 
speaking of rationality in the singular'. Here 'singularity' refers not to one monolithic 
generic type, but to an internally differentiated way of thinking which is able 'to account 
reflectively for its own context of emergence and thus its own place in history'. This 
self-reflective awareness of relative limits, which marks the modem philosophical role of 
communicative reason, is an impetus to ongoing agonistic struggle and creative 
networking in social relationships and understandings, so that adherence to totalising 
metanarratives, in Habermas's view, 'could never even arise'.l44 Philosophy, in this 











participants regarding the presuppositions of validity claims within and between different 
cultural value spheres and their constituent language games. This brings to light the 
manifold 'singularity' of reason as evinced in a variety of discursive contexts; at the same 
time, the tacit expectation of any speaker - to enlarge the sympathetic understanding of 
others - reflects the 'universalistic' dimension of communicative action. It is this 
(dis)integral tension between a non-absolute narrative pragmatics and a hypothetical. 
ideal agreement that constitutes modem philosophical discourse as the preserver of 
critical 'space', in its intertwinement with the forms of life that mediate our 
understanding of ourselves and the world(s) we inhabit. 
* * * 
From the foregoing analyses a distinct consonance emerges between Habermas, Foucault 
and Lyotard in their common regard for openness, problematization and transgression, 
and for specific contexts of social thought and action. The major difficulty pertains to the 
formulation of larger-scale policies and comprehensive knowledge, as theorised by 
Lyotard and Foucault, which requires a more explicit and prominent role for Habermas's 
communicative action. Concerning the first aspect - that of openness - there are clear 
similarities between the 'critical ontology' of Foucault, Habermas's 'counter-discourse of 
modernity', and Lyotard's 'narrative pragmatics'. Foucault elaborates this critical 
ontology in terms of the reflective work of 'thought', which problematizes our 
conventional perceptions, and is marked by an 'attitude' of critique characterising the 
'maturity' of the insubordinate Enlightenment thinker. All patterns of belief and action 
are regarded as provocative hypotheses, subject to processes of experimental 'testing' that 
are never conclusive, so sustaining an 'agonism' between freedom and control that puts 
us in the position of always beginrting again. Similarly, the plurality of language games 
depicted by Lyota.rd underscores his emphasis on the value and necessity of dissension 
and paralogy. The 'agonistic' wrestling with non-absolute 'rules' of a narratively variform 
community encourages an incredulity towards metanarrative striving, replacing consensus 
with ongoing 'states of discussion', and permitting the perpetual 'morphogenesis' of 
society. These views are in keeping with Habermas's emphasis on the openness required 
by communicative relations oriented to mutual understanding, incorporating a 'universal' 
or 'transcendental' moment that serves to provoke a 'going beyond' of existing norms, 
under the pressure of diverse criteria of contextualised meaning and validity. 
Communicative reason although articulated with the procedural discipline of a 











discourses and value spheres, and preserving the unsettling tension between the validity 
claims of 'own' and 'other'. 
Similarities appear, too, in the three writers' emphasis on historicity and 
particularity, resisting all absolutes. Foucault stresses the idea of truth as an historical 
'figure', determined by its use in specific contexts; correlatively, he contrasts the unifying 
work of theory or philosophy with the many micro-narratives, micro-norms and 
micro-revolutions of a multi-dimensional, dynamic society. Hence his reference to a 
diversity of 'specific intellectuals' and 'specific rationalities', thriving on the contingencies 
that are integral to the unstable and largely unco-ordinated web of a diversified 
'biopower'. Lyotard, too, views the subject as 'decentered' and society as a network of 
'temporary contracts', finite arguments and diverse 'competences'. There is no 
'noise-free' homogenising narrative; paralogy proliferates in response to 'fracta', 
differential relations, areas of indeterminacy. Similarly, Habermas accords due weight to 
the structural 'networking' of a multi-faceted lifeworld, and to the non-definitive 
instances of 'know-how' in various contexts of action and discursive interaction. He 
substitutes the reified formalism of abstract rule-systems with a flexibly 'situated' and 
differentiated faculty of reason, attuned to the substantive needs of 'specific totalities'. 
While giving prominence to specific, embodied totalities, Habermas grants only 
abstract and critical content to the idea of 'universal' totality, yet accepts as pragmatically 
necessary the formal coherence and unity intrinsic to the concept of totality itself. This is 
a relativised totality, presented not as the perfected product of an infallible intelligence 
but as the expression of mutable know-how attained in processes of social interaction. 
The mediating role of conununicative reason entails a constructive interpretation of the 
lifeworld as a finite intersubjective totality, and allows for collective decision-making and 
democratic policy-formation to occur, so giving effect to the 'obligatory' moment of 
mutual understanding. Despite their view of consensus as a 'suspect value', both 
Foucault and Lyotard give largely tacit support to the socially integrative role of 
conununication as the mediator of mutual understanding, however finite and temporary 
it is considered to be. This is evident in Foucault's deprecation of self-righteous 'polemic' 
in favour of self-disciplined dialogue, with its 'serious play' of reciprocal questions and 
answers and its respect for participatory 'rights'. There is also his recognition of the 
'general politics' of any regime of truth, with its regulated 'blocks' of determinable 
homogeneity and systematicity. What is lacking is a means of effecting a truly 
accountable transition between the subversive recodification of an old regime, at the 
microlevel, and the new regime's co-ordinating 'apparatus of truth', Some equitable 











'norms' and uniform 'laws'. or between the unpredictable 'theoretical coherence' of 
genealogically-prompted problematizations, and the 'practical coherence' of more 
purposive experimental 'testing'. Lyotard, too, vacillates on the co-ordinating role of 
general structures and assumptions in the formation of social policy: on the one hand, he 
decries the aspiration to communicational transparency and complete agreement, while 
on the other hand viewing the only source of 'legitimation' to be the 'linguistic practice 
and communicational interaction' of particular social communities. Both Foucault and 
Lyotard significantly qualify their valuable stress on the open, contingent and differential, 
by acknowledging the need for a formative moment that is amenable to reflective but 












CHAPTER THREE : SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SYMBOLIC MOVEMENT 
What the tensions and affinities between Habermas, Foucault and Lyotard have 
highlighted is the decentering, co-ordinating and legitimating role of a process of free 
and equal communication marked by reciprocal openness as the warrant of an intention 
to collaborate in forming a mutually acceptable social system. This process makes for 
maximally representative decision-making, and grants conditional credibility to 
resolutions reached. This composite validating role - pertaining to the process and 
correlatively to the product that eventuates - is important to an understanding of 
educative responsibility. In particular, it is to be asked whether educative 'success' is to 
be gauged by the substantive content of the participants' decisions and beliefs, or by the 
quality of the process by which such decisions and beliefs come to be held and 'ratified', 
Put another way, the question is whether educative 'justice' is evidenced by the specific 
content of the participants' resolutions and knowledge, or by the interactive conditions 
and procedures that eventuate in such resolutions and knowledge (whatever the specific 
content may happen to be). The answer to this question will significantly influence 
educators' conceptions of their task, and of the limits they impose on their role as leaders 
in the educative process. Thus, a primary regard for learners' reflective self-control 
might be set against the option of a primary regard for a specific context-relative 
interpretation of justified social knowledge. To some extent these formal and substantive 
options will tend to converge, owing to the educators' cultural embeddedness, but it is a 
key contention of the present argument towards a postmodern democracy that reflexive 
self-subsumption is made possible and enhanced by communicative reason and its 
recodifying power, to the benefit of both intentional creativity and collaborative 
self-control. In exploring further this challenging tension between social and educative 
justice, the arguments of John Rawls provide a provocative point of entry. 
Rawls on justice 
In elaborating his concept of 'justice as fairness',145 John Rawls disclaims any interest in 
universal principles or the 'essential nature and identity of persons'; his concern is not 
with justice as truth but justice as situated agreement within the public culture of a 
democratic society. This cultural tradition provides the 'intuitive' starting-point for a 
conception of society as a moral system of co-operation between free and equal persons. 
Social justice is conceived through the organisation of communal convictions into 
non-absolute 'principles' that express a provisional 'overlapping consensus' on the public 











citizens in a system of mutual co-operation. However, Rawls acknowledges that this is an 
'idealised' conception of beliefs intrinsic to the public culture of liberal democratic 
societies. Clearly, in fact, citizens are not all equally free; yet the political order is 
deemed to express an agreement validated by the requisite 'appropriate conditions': 'In 
particular, these conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow 
some persons greater bargaining advantages than others.'l46 This reflects the belief that 
any imbalance of power existing within society must not unfairly prejudice agreement on 
public policy in favour of any privileged person, class or group. 
To meet these appropriate conditions, Rawls proposes the notions of the 'veil of 
ignorance' and the 'original position', designed to expose dialogic partners more fully to 
the 'otherness' of their interlocutors, and to encourage radical questioning of customary 
presuppositions and practices. What remains unquestioned - at least in the public 
culture of liberal democratic societies - is the formal 'basic structure' of society as a 
share~ system of mutual co-operation between citizens as free and equal persons. In 
attempting to suspend and question the effect of our conventional limitations, privileges 
or assumptions, we must be able to become reflexively detached from ('ignorant' of) 
them, and try to engage with our partners from an 'original' - ideally undistorted -
'position', in shaping a more equitable order of relations. The veil of ignorance and the 
original position are not intended as mystifying metaphysical notions belying the reality 
of political inequality and injustice. On the contrary, they constitute a formal 'device of 
representation', in Rawls's terms, highlighting the value of 'a critical perspective' that is 
continually alert to the need for 'good reasons' for any public policy. (This device of 
representation is reminiscent of Habermas's appeal to the 'transcendent' as an always 
destabilising, critical notion, yet one that also gives credence to the subsequent claims to 
rational consensus.) The original position is not conceived to represent a 'natural right' 
(that is, a metaphysical or philosophical principle) but is an idealised or utopian 
conception that is felt to accord with the intuitions of members of a democratic society. 
Rawls is not trying to 'prove' the universal necessity of such intuitions but merely to 
express the traditional 'settled' conviction of a democratic culture.147 Paradoxically, 
however, the original position is postulated as an intrinsically unsettling device, insisting 
on the provocative value of an ideal, symmetrical relation between free and equal 
citizens, despite the contradictions and inadequacies of normal justice. The liberatory, 
revisionary thrust of the original position is evident, however, despite - or because of -










... one of our considered convictions, I assume, is this: the fact that we 
occupy a particular social position is not a good reason for us to accept, or to 
expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favours those in this 
position. To model this conviction in the original position the parties are not 
allowed to know their social position; and the same idea is extended to other 
cases. This is expressed figuratively by saying that the parties are behind a 
veil of ignorance.l48 
64 
The original position and the veil of ignorance therefore serve to model the 
decentering of the dialogic subject that is the prerequisite of rationally defensible 
argument. Precisely because it is a formal or idealised 'device of representation', such a 
conception escapes and works against the institutionalisation of any single set of beliefs 
as the final, exclusive arbiter of truth and justice. Any consensus reached will always be 
the imperfect product of contingent socio-historical communities; but avoiding the 
danger of viewing customary circumscriptions as inviolable requires the always-other of a 
transcendent or formal ideal, as the provocation to self-subsuming and self-critical 
dialogue. 149 It is precisely this presupposition of discursive relations in a democratic 
culture that gives credible, but temporary' and conditional, authority to any constraints 
that are subsequently imposed on all, in the desired service of social justice. These 
constraints are understood always to stand 'under erasure', in post-structuralist spirit150 -
to be liable to the unpredictable cancelling effects of the veil of ignorance, and subject to 
revision in the light of further communal experiences, language' games and perceptions. 
There is always a danger in the assumption that the goal of ideal interpersonal 
relationship is ever attained. While it is plausible to suggest that self-critical dialogue can 
help us towards public 'self-clarification' and to take a 'clear and uncluttered view of 
what justice requires' (as Rawls' intends), it is potentially misleading to think that 
complete transparency is ever realised. Such dialogue nonetheless helps to make us 
more susceptible to reciprocal 'unmasking', devoid of manipulative or aggressive 
intent. l5l (This ~s reminiscent of the Bakhtinian 'carnivalesque', denoting a transgressive, 
imaginative impulse, playfully yet seriously interrogating conventional hierarchies and 
social belief systems.)152 
In Rawls's view, an 'overlapping consensus' as the publicly shared basis of political 
decisions involves only those of our beliefs and practices which we are able to expose to 
the test of fundamental reflective critique. Convictions of an essentially obdurate or 
inscrutable kind are relegated in Rawls's scheme to the area of 'private' belief, and are 











commitments that are not compatible with the overlapping public consensus hitherto 
attained through self-reflective public debate must be relegated to a private sphere that 
will not controvert the community's ongoing quest for a generally accepted public good. 
Only beliefs that are exposed to critical reflection and the possibility of public revision 
are considered pertinent to political debate and public policy. This will ensure that no 
public policy takes on the character of an unquestionable doctrine. Clearly individuals 
differ in their religious beliefs concerning ultimate ends, for example, as is their right; but 
such differences are allowed to have no practical bearing on the public action 
provisionally ratified by a maximally decentered dialogue between all interested parties. 
It is in this spirit that Rawls regards 'justice as fairness' as staying 'on the surface, 
philosophically speaking'.153 This is in keeping with the modem proliferation of 
world-views and conceptions of the good, and with the loss of belief m 
philosophically-validated universal truths. Accordingly, Rawls writes, 
We must recognize that, just as on questions of religious and moral doctrine, 
public agreement on the basic questions of philosophy cannot be obtained 
without the state's infringement of basic liberties. Philosophy as the search 
for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I 
believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of 
justice in a democratic society.154 
(Here the 'basic liberties' alluded to are equally to be understood as non-universal 
constructs, being merely those accepted as necessary within the liberal-democratic 
tradition.) In effect, Rawls relegates to the sphere of the private imagination constructs 
that are incompatible in their practical effect with those ratified as workable hypotheses 
by public reason and put to the test of political action. 
A questionable aspect of Rawls's formulation, however, is his contention that 
hitherto fixed personal convictions about ultimate ends or truths 'are not to be 
introduced into political discussion'.155 This stricture might seem to dilute the 
significance of the original position as a device for the representation of unconditioned, 
free-thinking persons, open to revisionary stimuli without the threat of discourse 
censorship. It would be more consistent with the imaginatively-enlarging function of the 
veil of ignorance not to debar particular private beliefs (whatever their content) from 
public discussion, but to require th(!.t their adherents introduce them in a properly 
self-critical, dialogic spirit. Only by admitting all beliefs concerning both ultimate and 











role of exposing conventional identities and discourses to unforeseen transformations. 
Clearly, if institutional transformation were to negate or radically diminish the 'basic 
liberties' associated with the 'basic structure' of a democratic society (as understood by 
Rawls), this would entail the defeat of that democratic tradition, and its revolutionary 
replacement by an alternative, undemocratic order with its own value system. However 
as a 'political' conception, 'justice as fairness' allows alternative 'moral' conceptions of 
the good to flourish alongside one another without impinging substantively on the 
'kernel' of the overlapping consensus that underwrites a democratic constitution.156 
Rawls therefore believes justice as fairness answers to the need for social unity and 
co-operation on the basis of mutual respect, despite the modern loss of faith in universal 
good. According to this scheme, the basic structure of a society predisposed to such a 
system of mutual co-operation will be marked by 'two principles of justice' which give due 
weight to the claims of both individual and community, freedom and equality, negative 
and positive rights. The principles Rawls proposes in the interests of fair public debate 
and its 'reflective equilibrium' are stated as follows: 
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar 
scheme for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.157 
As will be argued later, howeve,r, the natUre of inequality in educative relationships 
necessitates a specifically educational interpretation of basic democratic rights and 
liberties, with particular reference to the teacher's and learner's relative control of the 
veil of ignorance as a critically enabling device. 
The reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus associated with the 
promissory original position and veil of ignorance: are seen by Alasdair MacIntyre as a 
misguided attempt to deny the reality of embodied social tensions, and to construct a set 
of general rationalisations that conceal or evade the conflict of interests out of which a 
more genuine sense of the communal good and narrative purpose could be forged. (In 











similarly to the point.) Rawls's social contract theory of justice is thought to imply a view 
of discrete groups of atomistic individuals, with disparate interests, coming momentarily 
together to formulate common rules of life by artificially bracketing the differences that 
characterise ordinary social relationships. ISS In MacIntyre's account (as in Barber's), 
liberalism is associated with the negative attempt to defuse the antagonism of 
irreconcilable opinions concerning the rational good by securing a 'neutral ground' from 
which a verdict may be passed on rival claims. The impossibility of wholly objective 
resolution has led to a deceptive pluralist rhetoric that works against the prospect of a 
communal narrative 'telos'. In MacIntyre's view, such a communal telos is properly 
. forged in the crucible of actual social conflict - from collective experience evincing a 
dialectical praxis rather than by the supposed resolutions of an abstract discursive logic. 
He argues that modern individualist morality is marked by the prominence of a scheme 
of optional 'rules' as antecedent guides to proper action. Accordingly, 'virtue' comes to be 
understood as obedience to pre-designed principles, existing as rational abstractions that 
are divorced from any substantial belief in specific communal goods and ends.159 
MacIntyre regards the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues as reversing the priority of law 
over virtue: thus, public conceptions of the good are derived from the contingent 
experience of struggling historical communities, and bestow only provisional authority on 
customary institutional norms and principles. Instead of relying on a range of rules as the 
impersonal index of 'legitimate expectations', MacIntyre believes we should be able to 
draw on a shared understanding of embodied narrative purpose, so as to determine the 
disposition of goods that best serves the ends of our own historically-conditioned 
community.l60 It is only this flexible grounding in a shared experience of conflict and 
inequality that permits context-specific purpose and dialectical progress as the dynamic 
expression of a communal will, in contrast to abstractly compartmentalised spheres of 
value and interest. It is liberal conceptions of the fragmented body politic that require a 
prominent structure of rules for right behaviour and for the protection of divergent 
preferences, rather than advancing active collaboration in pursuit of collective social 
ends.l61 
MacIntyre evidently regards the distinction between individual preferences and 
public projects as being unjust to the priority of positive collaboration in collective 
historical narratives. Although he is right to query the separation of personal convictions 
concerning ultimate goods and ends from the realm of public politics (as inferred from 
Rawls), he is insufficiently cognisant of the critical and catalytic potential of the veil of 
ignorance and the original position. These are not simply devices to ensure perfect 











the solvent power of the liminal imagination and the possibility of an enlarged perception 
of common purpose. The process of free and equal, rational debate need not be viewed 
in abstraction from worldly struggle. Just as theoretical and practical 'coherence' are 
mutually implicated in Habermas's account, and the conditions of an ideal speech 
situation are the desired co-implicates of a democratically-justified emancipatory praxis, 
so for Rawls the original position and the reflective equilibrium of an overlapping 
consensus should heighten and manifest the dialogic subjects' awareness of situated 
suffering and struggle. Participants in this open communicative process should find 
themselves exposed in unpredictable ways to the perceptions of both dominant and 
marginalised interest groups, to the benefit of mutual understanding and social renewal. 
The activity of a composite discursive field bears no necessary relation to a mystifying 
neutrality or to passive toleration, but can subject preferences and positions to 
unexpected pressure, with practical consequences for a more unified (but non-absolute) 
social narrative. MacIntyre himself, by appealing to the conditional validating force of 
communal preferences, accommodated to a common purpose, gives credence to Rawls's 
version of democratic liberalism as the expression not of a neutral ideal but of the settled 
and intuitive (though publicly revisable) convictions of a determinate tradition. Barber'S 
version of strong democracy is perfectly compatible with both Rawls and MacIntyre, 
properly understood. 
Whereas MacIntyre remains sceptical of Rawls's argument for a democratic 'basic 
structure' within which a plurality of heterogeneous beliefs and corresponding 'unions' 
can co-exist, Richard Rorty views Rawls's effort to 'stay on the surface, philosophically' as 
an appropriate alternative to any attempt to justify a universal order of meaning to 
humanity at large.162 MacIntyre asserts the continued need for a unifying sense of 
communal purpose, while Rorty celebrates a vision of people as 'centreless networks of 
beliefs' whose overlapping consensus on common interests stands without need of 
philosophical justification. Agreement amongst situated subjects is seen by him as the 
expression of 'ethnocentric' habits, creative latitude for which inheres in the reciphering 
effects of citizens' unrestrained conversation, as they come to terms imaginatively and 
pragmatically with their contingent social circumstances. Rorty's support of Rawls, like 
MacIntyre's opposition to him, is formulated in terms of a critique of the Enlightenment 
project and Enlightenment rationalism, characterised in by now familiar fashion as 
resting on universalist assumptions regarding ahistorical truth and essential human 
identity. As Rorty puts it, the 'theory that there is a relation between the ahistorical 
essence of the human soul and moral truth' supposedly 'ensures that free and open 











one with MacIntyre in dismissing talk of inalienable human rights, consonant with our 
common human nature, arguing that what counts as just is 'relative to one group to which 
we think it necessary to justify ourselves - to the body of shared belief that determines 
the reference of the word "we'" .164 Like MacIntyre, Rorty decries arguments back to 'first 
principles' unless this merely means the seeking of 'common ground in the hope of 
attaining agreement' ,165 He declares: 
I cannot find much use for philosophy in formulating means to the ends that 
we social democrats share, nor in describing either our enemies or our 
present danger. Its main use lies, I suspect, in thinking through our utopian 
visions. 1M 
This concession to the critical function of philosophy in 'thinking through' our utopian 
visions is suggestive: given that 'truth' in Rorty's view is 'made' not found, and given that 
our visions (those that guide our 'making') may be justified (thought through), at least to 
our community, in the 'hope of attaining agreement', there would seem to be little more 
than rhetorical not substantive differences between Rorty's postmodern aesthetic 
pragmatism, MacIntyre's communal narratives, and Habermas's communicative reason. 
The capacity to reflect on a given system of belief and to counterpose or correlate it with 
an imagined alternative is not normatively yoked to prior conventional criteria, nor is it 
the exclusive function of wholly autonomous individuals. It is the symptom of a 
decentering and reconstructive faculty that draws unpredictably on discursive 
relationships, however private or public, injecting into established patterns of thought 
and action a critical and creative force in the service of wider associations for the better 
attainment of future goals. The liminal imagination thus helps to energise 
strong-democratic involvement, injecting its transgradient, provocative power into the 
hypotheses of soci~l and personal endeavour. This unsettles the boundaries between the 
theoretical and hypothetical, scientific and imaginative, public and private, while serving 
as a precondition for self-reflective participation in a credible process of communal 
decision-making. The difference from the supposed Enlightenment version of true 
representation is merely that 'theory' derived from finite agreements is always subject to 
the ongoing 'test' of unforeseen experience, new discursive relationship, and responsive 
hypothesis-formation, as effected by an interactively productive citizenry. 
MacIntyre's expressed difference with ;Rawls may be better understood in the light 
of Rawls's distinction between an overlapping consensus (which forms the basis for his 











established social institutions, and the community's interpretation of their function, 
reflect 'a fund of implicitly shared fundamental ideas and principles' on which an 
overlapping consensus relies. Although these culturally fundamental and often intuitive 
shared ideas and principles are not themselves taken to constitute a comprehensive 
religious, philosophical or metaphysical system, they are nonetheless not inherently 
incompatible with the diverse comprehensive belief-systems in the community at large. 
The overlapping consensus therefore embraces the points of common or overlapping 
belief amongst the various cultural sub-sectors of the community. These points of 
identity Rawls terms 'theorems . . . at which the comprehensive doctrines in the 
consensus intersect or converge'.l68 Because of this minimally necessary compatibility 
with the plurality of private or sectional belief-systems, Rawls can claim to avoid the 
charge that his conception of justice is indifferent to citizens' substantive 
truth-commitments. The stability of an overlapping consensus depends precisely on its 
not being entirely irrelevant to the world-views and convictions of the participants. 169 
This is what differentiates it from a modus vivendi agreement, such as a treaty. The 
common motivation for adherence to a modus vivendi arrangement by the parties 
concerned is expedient merely, involving the mutual suspension of hostilities for the 
negative reason that it is conditionally advantageous for the separate disputants to do so. 
The result is an unstable unity that barely conceals antagonistic interests (Barber's 
depiction of thin-liberal 'minimalism' and 'realism' come to mind as pertinent here as 
well.) In contrast to a positive overlapping consensus, then, reflecting certain common 
intrinsic interests, a modus vivendi represents an expedient submission to certain rules as 
a necessary political tactic. 
This argument by Rawls is evidently intended to rebuff the charge that an 
overlapping consensus is no different from thin-liberal 'bargaining', as conceived by 
MacIntyre and Barber. However, MacIntyre would not be convinced by the 
non-dialectical stability that is connoted by a reflective equilibrium and an overlapping 
_ consensus. Rawls himself appears to be suitably cautious of the ideal scheme he draws. 
This caution reflects his awareness of the plurality of modem belief-systems - a plurality 
that serves both to justify his case for a non-absolute, political conception of justice and 
simultaneously to place it in jeopardy. This constitutes a tension in his argument which 
invites the kind of critique that MacIntyre presents. Rawls acknowledges that 
heterogeneity embracing radically different and even contradictory value systems poses a 
threat to co-operation on key issues, even raising the spectre of physical conflict.l70 The 
lack of agreement on the requisite terms of 'fair social co-operation consistent between 











benefit of none.l71 Faced with this impasse, however, opponents may resort to a modus 
vivendi agreement as a necessary first step on the path to a more stable and potentially 
more equitable dispensation. Rawls argues that historically the principle of toleration 
was first accepted in the spirit of a modus vivendi following the Reformation; in this 
respect Barber and MacIntyre could agree with him. However, this phase in liberal 
politics is but a transitional one, in Rawls's account, being instrumental in the gradual 
development of a more genuine and intrinsically stable overlapping consensus (evidently 
in the spirit of Barber's strong-democratic talk). Such development from an initial 
modus vivendi relation is held to be a realistic option, because most people's 'religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and 
comprehensive'.l'n Sufficient 'slippage' and flexibility ensues to allow for mutually 
co-operative accommodation to a common political conception of justice that establishes 
the basic participatory rights and liberties of all. Only by then taking such basic matters 
off the agenda can we secure stable terms of political co-operation; leaving them on the 
agenda would be dangerously unsettling, Rawls believes, by raising the stakes of political 
controversy, increasing public insecurity and perpetuating opportunistic antagonism. 
Fixing the initial terms of social co-operation, even as a modus vivendi initially, will 
generate the 'tendency' for the 'essential co-operative virtues' to develop. A modus 
vivendi compromise based on negative rights can thus mature into an overlapping 
consensus based on positive moral grounds.173 Irreconcilable fundamental beliefs are 
necessarily excluded from the initial agenda in the interests of longer-term mutual 
understanding and possible agreement. (This transitional potential of a modus vivendi 
relationship suggests the unrealised potential for strong-democratic encounter which 
Barber attributes to thin-liberal minimalism, as discussed in Chapter One.) 
If Rawls is justly suspicious of the premature fixing of a specific 'comprehensive 
doctrine' as the authoritative guiqe to the destiny of all, so MacIntyre is justly suspicious 
of the premature fixing of 'basic rights and liberties' as the technically correct parameters 
within which 'fair' social interaction and decision-making can occur. The equitableness of 
an initial working arrangement between parties to a modus vivendi is indeed difficult to 
ascertain. The negative terms of the initial arrangement, proposing mutual non-coercion, 
may fail to address effectual imbalances of power in the initial talk that Ra~ls thinks will 
mature into a viable overlapping consensus. What will be required, it seems, are 
effective 'facilitating' leaders (in Barber's sense) who are capable of ensuring a credible 
balance of power within the working framework. The effective presence of such 
facilitators would help to answer the question whether Rawls, by removing fundamentally 











emasculates or protects the stimulating role of the always-other, as manifested in 
mutually open and responsive discursive relations. Presumably once underlying 
antagonisms have given way to terms of basic collaboration, with the help of facilitating 
leaders, then the self-subsuming potential of the veil of ignorance and original position 
will be a more manifest part of the participants' communicative ethics. Competing 
ground motives will then be more reflexively viewed, so increasing the prospect of a 
'slippage' in respective beliefs and non-negotiables that might lead to greater mutual 
sympathy and reconciliation. The continued disqualification of sharply different 
convictions from the arena of public political debate is unnecessary once the modus 
vivendi arrangement has changed into a more stable system of co-operation. Continued 
disqualification of such convictions would give credence to the charge that supposedly 
representative social agreements, valorised by the normative formalities of an ideal 
speech situation, are really no different from any modus vivendi concluded within the 
expedient framework of 'thin' liberal democracy. It is indeed only by admitting all 
conflicting perspectives to the arena of public discourse that strong democratic relations, 
bred of an openness to and engagement with otherness, can flourish and give rise to the 
resilient narrative purpose that communitarians like MacIntyre and Barber wish to 
advance. However, there is one fundamental right that cannot be put under erasure 
without self-contradiction in any system that aspires to democratic justice - namely, the 
right to free and equal participation in the formation and ratification or revision of public 
policy. 
This democratic requirement indicates the value of the distinction between formal 
and substantive 'norms', in respect of social justice: The basic right of participatory 
autonomy is best viewed as a formal ideal, not itself ideologically contained (at least 
within the inherently contested arena of democratic politics). It constitutes a 
'transcendent' norm for the validation of any public policy whatever its empirical or 
substantive content. It is this basic, formal right to fundamental communicative liberty 
that one such as Rawls would rightly wish to remove from the political agenda as 
something liable to cancellation. Vigilant political concern for this right and its imperfect 
historical manifestation is certainly called for - and this entails ideological struggle in 
specific contexts; but as a formal ideal, this right to participatory autonomy may be 
regarded as a transcendent or trans-ideological prerequisite of 'truly' representative 
government. As has been noted, however, Rawls would eschew the universalistic 
connotation of 'transcendent', seeing the right to equal critical involvement as the 
culture-specific intuition of democratic communities. (It will be argued in Chapter Four 











relatively disengaged toleration of plurality, bears certain valuable implications for the 
prospect of a non-manipulative relationship between teachers and learners, in the 
longer-term interest of democratic health.) Philip Wexler is another who gives equal 
prominence to this discursive liberty but who is equally anxious to renounce any 
implication that this is a universal principle. By viewing reference to normative absolutes 
in negative terms only - as dangerously metaphysical - Wexler, it will be argued, limits 
unnecessarily the productive capacity that his 'textualist' analysis of socio-cultural form is 
intended to release.174 
Wexler on symbolic movement 
Philip Wexler proposes the practice of social analysis and of education as forms of 
'symbolic collective historical action', in keeping with the postmodern emphasis on 
non-foundational process rather than on falsely stable notions of truth and being. In 
contrast to the ostensibly ahistorical and essentializing tendencies of positivist, 
universalist and humanist thought, Wexler's post-positivist 'social analysis' is directed 
towards the re-animation of historical and symbolic 'movement'. His is a 'contextual 
approach' to social knowledge - an approach that is held to be neither idealist nor 
materialist yet to be compatible (through 'discourse') with both: discourse (as symbolic 
action) may be 'autonomously described' yet is simultaneously understood as 'always and 
integrally historical and social'. Wexler adds: 'Neither object nor subject, social 
knowledge is a process of contextually meaningful symbolic action.'175 It offers a 
practicable conception and vision of collective mobilisation and action that is coherent 
and purposive, but not totalising in its achievements or its claims. It is, accordingly, in the 
specified context of an overly commodified ('post-industrial') culture that Wexler argues 
the particular historical relevance of post-structural theory, capable of redeeming 
signifying activity from ideological occlusion, by desublimating and reciphering public 
discourse. It is the experience of 'symbolic movement' in a post-industrial semiotic 
society that needs to be seen in both its political and educational dimensions. The 
capacity 'to form and direct speech' is itself formed by education, and is the generative 
source of political power and self-empowerment. Education is therefore crucial to the 
formation of society, not least of all to one that aspires to reflect or represent the 
dynamic will of a citizenry that is empowered to contribute equally and freely to 
socially-formative speech. 
Wexler's contextual, semiotic approach to social analysis is claimed to go beyond 
what he calls 'sociological liberalism' in both its 'old' and 'new' forms. The 'old' sociology 











rationalism and liberalism, marked by its orientation to objective truth, as perceived by 
free and autonomous, rational individuals. Old sociology was thus assumed to contribute 
to knowledge held to be accumulatively coherent, and testifying to the integrating insights 
of an authoritative mind. This denial of 'dispersion' in the liberal discourse of old 
sociology conduces to a confidence in techniques of surveillance and control, to the 
detriment of those ideas, actions and persons that do not meet the standards of the 
prevailing system of belief. The ethos-of freedom and reason associated with liberalism 
therefore mystified the reality of victimisation, in favour of those in control of the means 
and fruits of knowledge production. 
The 'new' sociology arose in reaction to the ideological implications of old 
sociological Hberalism - the avowed neutrality and objectivity of the latter found to be 
hiding its 'interested social basis' (in Wexler's words).176 'New' sociology reflected a loss 
of faith in a supposedly impartial model of society and of education, grounded in an 
absolute consensus. It highlighted the role of education in reproducing unequal class 
relationships, and argued the need for resistance and contestation that testify to a critical 
consciousness. New sociology emphasised the interest-relative, social construction of 
knowledge, and the inequality associated with classroom relationships between teachers 
and learners, and with the hegemony of capitalist-liberalism. New sociology sought to 
create a 'culture of critical discourse' that would demystify the idealist, objectivist and 
positivist analyses of old sociological liberalism by revealing its ideological functioning: 
the controlled educational and social inequality evinced a hidden curriculum, ensuring 
socialization into values and positions that corresponded to the dominant social 
structure.177 
Despite this needful attention to contextual and ideological dimensions of social 
reproduction, Wexler finds the new sociology to be overly theoretical and abstract, 
elevating its counter-concepts to 'the same trans historical, static level' of those it opposes. 
Its stress on reproduction, resistance and contradiction, and on an abstract culture of 
critical discourse is viewed as an academic rationalisation, a model that is not conducive 
or responsive to significant transformations in specific contexts of historical struggle.l78 
New sociology tends to be 'acontextual', 'above and beyond social history'; it is the 
creation of leftist intellectuals, drawing belated academic inferences from the activities of 
the American New Left movement of the 1960s. Despite the defeat of liberal-humanist 
ideals by New Right 'technocratic-conservatism', the new sociology remained (Wexler 
argues) fundamentally a critique of liberalism, illustrating the abstractness of its belated 











intent, the new sociology is found to be complicit with liberal ideology, by limiting its 
opposition to the terms set by the superordinate group: 'resistance' to predetermining 
'real' structures is highlighted, rather than the more positive, transgressive striving of an 
ascendant group for its own alternative goals. In confirming a pattern of suppressive 
social relations, new sociology clings to an objectivist epistemology that reinforces the 
reifying logic of liberal-realist discourse. Although new sociology calls for critical 
reflexivity, this is claimed by Wexler to be a matter of personal awareness, consonant 
with the 'idealist subjectivism' of liberal individualism. Conflict is not properly theorised 
and studied 'as a struggle over the forces of societal self-production' - that is, as a 
collective, relational struggle against 'commodified' institutional meaning.l79 The 
ontology of representational realism is antithetical to such practical struggles, obscuring 
the fact that prevalent social conditions are not definitive but are the mutable products of 
a 'refiguring' labour. On two grounds, then, new sociology has proved critically 
ineffectual, in Wexler's view: by not encoding resistance in terms of specific contextual 
and collective struggle; and by promoting a realist ontology that overlooks the signifying, 
discursive labour by which collective figures of order are actively produced, in 
accordance with changeable perceptions and needs. Its emphasis on a general critical 
consciousness belittles the prerequisite of contextualised understanding and its discursive 
constitution through processes of historical movement. 
It is in reaction to these imputed failings of the new sociology - its unwanted 
adoption of liberal-encoded terms of debate, and consequent impotence in the context of 
a rightist resurgence - that Wexler seeks in post-structuralist discourse theory a means 
of restoring transformative movement to an over-commodified social context. This is not 
self-evidently an anti-Enlightenment project on his part, but it is 'an Enlightenment not 
of reason but of movement'.lso Concepts and theories are understood as 
socially-produced cultural 'tools', devised for specific communal purposes. It is a sense of 
socio-historical and symbolic movement that counteracts the 'givenness' of society and its 
naturalised truths, giving impetus to collective self-production and a new responsiveness 
to contingent experience. Post-structuralism, with its stress on the differential deferment 
of meaning along an unstable chain of contingent signifiers is regarded as the herald of 
movements in which 'discourse, language, meaning and knowledge' are bent to the 
formative will of collective subjects through a process of ongoing 'hermeneutic 
conversation'. It is the open mutuality of interactional speech that enables the symbolic 
re-formation of collective subjects an.d the knowledge appropriate to changing contexts. 
A new social and educational politics arises from an understanding of social knowledge 












rather than as corresponding with essential realities. It is collective, reciprocal activity 
that makes transformative knowledge possible. Wexler calls this post-structural 
re-writing 'textualism': an anti-reifying theory of practice for the post-industrial age (this 
is a time in which dispersed networks of information bear a counterhegemonic potential 
despite their use also as mobile instruments of system control).l81 Textualism is a 
'theoretical icon of the semiotic society', with its contradictory tendencies towards the 
symbolic incapacitation of the 'spectatorially incorporated subject' and, in contrast, the 
democratic appropriation and reconstitution of discourse through open cultural 
negotiation. Awareness of semiosis as a generative condition of social knowledge and of 
diverse 'cultural narratives' therefore offers to 'unchain the means of signification from 
traditional emplacements' and, through 'discursive procedures of communicational 
interaction', to engage a recuperated conscious collectivity in the reorganisation of their 
ongoing relational narrative. A more 'democratic informationalism' may thus be secured, 
in opposition to prestructured commodified meaning, by redeeming the discursive 
dynamics of 'relational speech' and 'responsible dialogic conversation' .182 Through this 
process of maximally unrestrained conversation an 'identity politics' can gain an entry, 
not in terms of a single authoritarian model of relationships but in the variable and 
renegotiable terms of self-defining collective subjects. There will always be a dialectical 
tension between a newly defined narrative identity and further transgressive rewriting, 
between de-reification and recommodification; but it is in the nature of textualism as an 
historicised theory of postmodern political practice that the symbolic movement it 
defines be always the occasion for 'decomposition' and democratic reinscription.183 
With regard to education, Wexler conceives of schools as sites of collective 
self-formation, where conventional disciplinary boundaries and authorised truths are 
exposed to meaningful reconstitution. Both right-liberal meritocratic individualism and 
left-liberal critical formalism give way to the learners' relational struggle for power over 
generative symbolic resources. As Wexler writes, 'it is becoming dearer in the struggle 
over knowledge production that education means the capacity to control, to generate, 
refigure, configure and extrapolate the signifier', and to 'rationally reappropriate the 
discursive means of signification, speech, identity and social relations'.l84 Wexler thus 
highlights the creative value of destabilisation, transgression and mov~ment, while 
implicitly retaining a dependency on 'form': there is a necessary dialectic between 
process and stasis, becoming and being, transformation and discipline a creative 
dialectic that relies for its power on both co-ordinate poles. The role of reason in 
articulating appropriate truths for specific contexts is preserved, but as always subject to 











normative presence, against which it presses its creative force. Where Wexler's 
postmodern argument is particularly valuable, however, is in opening up the field of 
debate to meet the conditions of an inclusive participatory democracy. No 'other' is 
excluded, a priori, from the process of knowledge production and social construction; 
dynamic interrelationship is emphasised as a condition of democratic action and of 
maximal rational consensus. It is only through this conversational inclusiveness that 
criteria for the contextually most helpful, just or true course of collective action may be 
determined. But criteria entail a degree of system, of regulation, and of conditional 
symbolic commodification. Whether in the form of imaginative experimental hypotheses 
or provisionally integrated theory, such systematic construals are assumed to bear 
relevantly on a mutually intelligible 'real' state of affairs, and so to be the occasion of an 
appropriate response. The claims of realism, objectivism and stable identity are not 
entirely discredited by being conceived as mobile discursive constructs; instead, if 
discourse is made to retain a plasticity coequal to the historical contingency of those 
through whom it comes to effect, then these traditional sources of stability may be 
redeemed from authoritarian fixity, and serve as suitably supple heuristic and pragmatic 
dimensions of collective self-production. 
Wexler's qualified incorporation of the realist paradigm in the very processes of 
what this thesis terms a 'postmodern democracy' emerges at various points in his 
argument. Thus, his 'new contextualism' stresses a version of 'knowing' as an historical 
cultural practice, in the course of which concepts and actions are produced in the service 
of theorisable communal purposes.lSS The singularity of any collective subject - in 
keeping with an Enlightenment of movement - is said to be grounded in people's 
'common processual location' or in a 'similar trajectory motion'. The experience of 
particular groups may manifest a 'logic' serving to define a 'collective mode of being', 
which places them on the same 'wave length' on important issues, and which enables 
their mobilisation around 'the same principles of articulation, configuration and 
self-defining gestalt-formation' .186 Yet these theorisable'principles' come to effect 
through a pre-theoretical 'process of movement' through which functional ideologies are 
'revealed' and socially effective resources are 'located'. Thus, a social and symbolic 
'economy of identity' is manifested and brought to critical consciousness, demanding a 
judiciously 'balanced mixture of identity-commitments and deprivations', with due regard 
for contemporary, communicable needs.187 This presupposes the dialogic activity of 
mutually decentering and constitutive social agents, who are oriented to prospective 
agreement concerning an actual state of affairs, and to interventions that will have 











implicit in this process of collective knowledge production and will formation, 
nothwithstanding the willingness to question entrenched assumptions and to re-vision the 
social good in utopian terms. The danger of authoritarian, technocratic control is 
guarded against, however, by the continuance of a maximally open public conversation 
that exposes existing interpretations to a denaturalising dynamism. Nonetheless, the 
prosecution of any communal narrative or struggle entails strategies that rely for their 
potential effect on the delineation of structural positions, in relation to which purposive 
initiatives and counter-movements may be marshalled. Wexler's opposition to the 
theoretical mapping of structural relations (as attributed to 'new' sociological critical 
formalism, for example) does not overcome this abstract representational technique but 
merely incorporates it into a more supple and largely unpredictable process of ongoing 
struggle. His claim that an emphasis on 'historical movement' makes possible a 
'non-ideological' sociologyl88 is misleading, therefore, if it is taken to imply the total 
absence of provisionally stabilised concepts as representations of a contextually 
naturalised truth. While he is right to see in symbolic reification the would-be 
'naturalizing' work of a mystificatory ideology, it seems necessary to distinguish the 
enabling, liberating necessity of democratically ratified (but never final) certainty, from 
the disabling pseudo-rational representations of a complacent authoritarianism. Wexler's 
formulation rests on precisely this distinction, but in a way that complicates rather than 
replaces the customary reliance on a language of credible theory and objective certainty. 
Hence, the alliances that develop, unpredictably, around issues of common concern, 
engendering the largely unpremeditated formation of self-producing collective subjects, 
are the spontaneous crucibles of 'inchoate' theories that are subsequently discerned to be 
'integral' to the new movements, validating a certain systematic 'prioritization of 
knowledge and identity' as the 'vanguard elements' in its emergent self-directed struggle. 
These systematized vanguard elements are the implicit nub of a distinctive 
socio-ideological theory, giving conscious coherence to the activity of collective 
re-formation.189 (Associated with this is, of course, the problematic prospect of a 
structured education programme, designed with specific valued objectives in mind.) The 
fact that knowledge production is held by Wexler to be a post-structuralist 'series of 
editings and recodings' en route to 'the social definition of a product' does not entirely 
undermine the traditional concern of Enlightenment rationalism with justifiable 
principles as the integrating basis of a collectively unifying philosophy of life or 
programme of action. The fact that 'reality' is made rather than reflected or revealed 
does not render the language of transparency untenable but crucially relativises its 











Although textualism is, potentially, a purely academic discourse about decentered 
discourse in general, it is redeemed in Wexler's view by the fitness of its current historical 
appropriation - in the face of unwarranted cultural commodification and symbolic 
reification. Its strategic fitness, in this perspective, is counter-cultural; yet it is also 
underwritten, paradoxically, by the versatile symbolic networking of our contemporary 
semiotic society. The consumerist individualism that serves to promote commodity 
production is also seen as an internal source of opposition: 'Production-required, 
autonomy and the ethos of freedom pass beyond expected bounds of organisational 
containment.'l90 However, if the reality of general symbolic movement (as reflected in 
the abstract theory of 'textualism') may be used by reflective individuals to substantive 
c'ritical effect, it would seem unnecessary to maintain a view of new sociological critical 
theory as a purely 'rhetorical' paradigm, as Wexler does, intrinsically hypostatized in the 
hands of its academically institutionalised proponents. Wexler's willingness to defend 
and espouse a desublimating social reading of academic semiotic theory (as a 'theory of 
practice') but not an equally optimistic desublimating reading of new sociological critical 
theory is unconvincing. If textualism may inspirit contextual movement, it could equally 
be argued that new sociological critical theory, despite its formal abstractions, may 
inspire a substantive critical practice. The crucial factor is a continual responsiveness to 
contingent pressures and perspectives: if new sociological critical theory is indeed only 
retrospective unimaginatively detached from social processes then Wexler's 
objection to it as purposeless and historically impotent is justified; if, however, critical 
theory is inherently amenable to contextual refiguring, as an ongoing process, then there 
is little to distinguish it from Wexler's postmodern social analysis. An imaginative, 
prospective orientation is considered by Wexler to be a 'reluctant' potential of critiCal 
theory but a distinguishing characteristic of symbolic theory. While new sociology is 
'reminiscent', rationalising 'historical memory' as a practice of 'negation', social analysis 
is consid~red 'anticipatory': 
My claim is: theories which operate in the realm of symbolic processes and 
discourse, that might broadly be called 'literary' or symbolic theories, are 
representations of new forms of critical social practice.l9l 
Wexler contradictorily distinguishes post-structuralist social analysis from critical theory 
in terms of its focus on discursive instability - the vital means of producing new 
understandings and practices - in contrast to the 'reified products' that both old and new 
sociological liberalism take for 'things' or 'ideas'.l92 But the counterhegemonic drive 











. that leads to the ratification of a new social 'product'. This Wexler explicitly 
acknowledges: ' ... where symbolic communicational or discursive practices begin to be 
understood as socially important, they are not left to their own anti-metaphysical play';193 
the 'formative, active role of symbolic processes' only takes effect as critical practice, 
therefore, by way of a justifiable choice to close down on dispersion and difference. But 
this acknowledgement appears to dilute the force of Wexler's association of social 
analysis with process - as its distinguishing feature - and with an Enlightenment of 
'movement'. His symbolic economy of identity (like Foucault's) clearly requires 
provisionally 'fixed' centres, derived through and justified by contextualised processes of 
dialogic conversation. The 'real', Wexler writes, comes to definition as 'the discursive 
procedures of communicational interaction';l94 it is through these 'procedures' that the 
'common processual location' of a collective subject can be ascertained. The valuable 
portrayal of reality and identity in terms of dynamic process and interactive procedure 
should not obscure the evident importance of the 'real' as collectively shaped 'product', 
reflecting the articulable 'logic' of a collective 'mode of being'. A common 'trajectory of 
motion' towards some anticipated goal is clearly discernible as such only in terms of 
communicable, integrating principles. The orientation to a common future (which Wexler 
finds lacking in new sociological critical theory) goes hand in hand with a commitment to 
democratic conversation between free and equal, mutually decentering and constitutive, 
dialogic partners. This is a commitment to realising an imagined future that correlates 
with mutually acceptable anticipatory ideals. These are adumbrated in concrete terms as 
socially relevant hypotheses, cognate with experimental public policies, and are exposed 
to the test of ongoing experience and its attendant discursive renditions, on the evidence 
of which they will either be communicatively reaffirmed, revised or rejected. 
Implicit even in the post-structuralist textualism of Wexler's symbolic social theory, 
therefore, is the outline of a neo-positivist paradigm, according to which proposed ideals, 
beliefs and actions are subjected to an ongoing democratic process of empirical testing, 
interpretation and evaluation with critical regard to communal ideals, needs and 
objectives. This highlights the challenge of political management: the constitutive labour 
of an active body politic should not succumb to a rigid 'technology of control' but must 
keep collective practices and goals open to democratic renovation and revaluation. The 
terms in which communal significance is made v111 clearly be relative to the discursive 
frameworks of 'the people' - a fact which suggests both limitation and possibility. This 
depends on the participants' capacity to reach beyond the circle of their customary 
discursive preferences, and to entertain the disorienting and reorienting perspectives of 











justifies ongoing conversation in pursuit of an always elusive perfect concord. A residual 
desire for complete integration is valuably nurtured and simultaneously thwarted by 
ruptures and gaps in the interdiscursive weave that sustains the liminal imagination. 
These aporia are testimony of imperfection, yet they equally fuel a politics of hope, 
oriented to universal harmony. The ideal goal of rational mastery, of perfect 
understanding, of universal truth, is valuable as a permanent provocation, precisely 
because it is metaphysically elusive, utopian and 'unrealistic'. It is nonetheless 
discernible as a tacit factor in any attempt to express an intelligible thought or attitude 
about life; the very use of signs presupposes their signifying coherence and their 
integration in a symbolic system constituted as such by a logic of some perceptible kind. 
Potential agreement or mutual understanding within vitally reciprocal relationships is a 
necessary co-implicate of all discourse (as Habermas contends), arid it is this which 
makes the repressive exclusion of otherness an act of self-curtailment as well. 
Permanently commodified discourse ceases to be discourse in any meaningful sense, but 
becomes a mute 'object', detached from any enlargening community of debate and from 











CHAPTER FOUR: EDUCATION FOR A POSTMODERN DEMOCRACY 
Through the preceding discussion of certain contemporary debates in social philosophy, 
this thesis has sought to highlight the diversely articulated interrelation of radical 
openness and collaborative coherence, as maintained through an ongoing process of 
democratic dialogue and decision-making. 'Strong' democratic hypothesis-formation is 
sustained through its continued susceptibility to the unsettling provocations of the 
'liminal imagination'; equally, the normative and theoretical implications of the 
'successful' experimental testing of public hypotheses must themselves remain exposed to 
the counterhegemonic 'movement' of discourse, as engendered by the diverse 
encipherings of distinct interpretative communities. The need to submit positive 
communal knowledge to the ongoing challenge of postmodern 'rewriting' entails a view 
of truth as ever-subject to the test of unconstrained debate. No ideological options are 
excluded a priori from this process; nor is it subordinated finally to any dominant 
ideological consensus (if it is to serve the public culture of a democratic society). No 
subst·antive belief-commitments should be excluded from this realm of open debate, but 
all such truth-perspectives must be advanced only as part of the process of mutually 
enlarging public reflection. No public policy need ever arrogate to itself the right 
permanently to delimit the sphere of open public discourse. The empirical and 
transcendental 'moments' must remain valuably distinct, in Habermas's sense, to allow 
for unforeseeable changes in public conceptions of relevant truth. 
In what follows, speculative inferences for education and public life will be drawn from 
the arguments presented in the preceding chapters, with some reference once again to 
the particular tendencies of Christian National Education, liberal theory of education, 
and People's Education. It will be contended here that a distinction must be made 
between teachers' specifically educative responsibility, and their personal civic 
responsibility as sharers in the process of public talk and decision-making. The former is 
regarded here as having two dimensions: as publicly accountable servants of society, 
teachers may be expected to induct learners into communally-valued cultural knowledge; 
equally,' in the interests of the learners' eventual independence of thought, teachers 
should induct learners into the non-coercive, open process of participatory dialogue and 
critical reflection. It is possible, and necessary, to distinguish between the teachers' 
answerability to democratically-ratified educational expectations, reflected perhaps in 
substantive curricular content, and their responsibility to the students' increasingly 
autonomous dialogic power. Further, a distinction should be maintained between 











cItIzens are assumed to share as communicative equals; and, on the other hand, 
education for political democracy, in which learners gradually acquire the discursive 
ability to participate socially as mutually formative yet self-responsible agents. The 
teacher's relatively superior capacity as a discursively-empowered, reflexive political 
agent must not impinge with indoctrinating force (however well-intentioned) on the 
learners as relatively vulnerable, less reflexive, culturally dependent beings. A 
qualification is necessary, however, pertaining to the adverse impact of existing political 
structures on this desired process of education for participatory democracy. It is at this 
interface between counterhegemonic educational process and established political 
practice that the ideal of a postmodern democracy suggests a contextually appropriate 
but ideologically non-coercive 'position' for teachers to advance, in the longer-term 
interests of an enlarged and self-responsible democratic citizenry. 
Philip Wexler, as has been shown, regards 'textualism' as an appropriate 
desublimating theory of practice in a semiotic society. However, owing to the 
inevitability of a degree of symbolic 'commodification' in any stable cultural context, and 
the attendant danger of metadiscursive closure, the counterhegemonic potential. of 
textualism's reciphering power is a valuabte social and educational asset for every society 
that aspires to dynamically representative self-government. It is a contextually 
appropriate, strategic resource in any potentially fixed symbolic collectivity or 
determinate 'society', and it has ideological implications owing to its counterhegemonic 
promise. Nonetheless, it is ideologically non-coercive, in that although the redeeming of 
collective signifying activity bears signal implications for political self-government it does 
not predict or prescribe the belief-content of substantive decisions to be made by a 
self-formative citizenry. 
There are difficult issues and qualifications to be explored, however, particularly for 
education. Crucially, one wishes to know what this all means for the practice of teaching 
in an ideologically-riven context such as our own. Primarily, it seems to require a 
responsibility to education as a process of symbolic 'making' by increasingly 
self-reflective, interdependent social agents. Problematically, this responsibility to an 
anti-manipulative educational process is inseparable from a responsibility to defend this 
process from determinable threat, and to mediate the cultural knowledge which the 
education system, by democratic consent, might be communally mandated to purvey. In 
South Africa, harmful socio-ideological structures clearly constitute a threat to the 
formation of the free and equal relationships that sustain a democratic society. Harmful 











exploitation) and attitudinal (such as racial or cultural prejudice). Loyalty to the 
educative process must therefore entail an exposure of the substantive contextual limits 
placed upon it by such unjust structures of conventional belief and action. This exposure 
is fully consonant with the teachers' personal civic responsibility beyond the classroom 
and curriculum - that is, with their role as sharers in the process of public talk and policy 
making. Inside the classroom, however, the teachers' exposure of limits that condition 
the learners' perception requires a different circumspection, in view of the learners' 
relative vulnerability to authoritarian influence and possible manipulation. 
Inside the classroom, the teachers' awareness of socio-ideological influences on the 
desired process of equitable communicative interaction coexists with the dual 
responsibility to induct learners into a field of valued cultural knowledge In 
accordance with the prevailing public will - and also to expose the nature of such valued 
knowledge as a non-absolute, potentially revisable construction. By purveying curricular 
content in accordance with publicly endorsed norms and standards, teachers evince 
accountability to the specifications of the communal will (which they 'represent', in the 
educational context); but by exposing such content as a non-absolute construction, 
designed for supposedly enabling purposes, they will also evince some accountability to 
the ongoing democratic process by enhancing the learners' capacity for reflexive thought 
and critique. Awareness of curricular content as a non-absolute - albeit conventionally 
valued - cultural construction should enable learners to enter distinct or new discursive 
domains without regarding them as perfectly definitive, unquestionable or self-evident. 
Acquaintance with any new discursive dimension will entail a relatively naive, primary 
receptiveness in the learner, as a prerequisite of further, more discriminating 
engagement and possible reconstruction; but what is essential, if the learner is not to 
remain naive and uncritical, is the presence of a discursive terrain or arena where both 
new and customary languages and perspectives may be entertained and subjected to 
interactive assessment. This requires a degree of dialogic flexibility for learners, 
relatively free of authoritarian direction and coercion. However, where the curricular 
agenda calls for a clear distinction between right and wrong, there must be a point at 
which the teacher enters the arena to assist students in arbitrating between available 
options, in terms of the rules of the pertinent curricular or academic game. In any 
process of education accountable to democratically warranted needs and priorities, the 
learners' freedom will be qualified by a regard for the norms and standards held to be 
justified by the larger community. Tl)is constitutes a practical and ethical limitation on 
the freedom allowed to teachers and learners, within the game rules of any 











'system' of education marked by unrestrained heterogeneity and unorthodox relationships 
may not be justified and initiated, but even this preference will need to express a 
democratic consensus, to which teachers will be mandated to give representative effect. 
The preceding discussion attempts to indicate a means by which even fairly centralised 
and standardised education systems can be held accountable to democratically ratified 
but revisable norms pertaining to freedom and authority, while also fostering the 
learners' awareness of limits as non-absolute and as the potential occasion and stimulus 
of collaborative 'rewriting'. 
The crucial question, therefore, is whether an education process that is disciplined 
in conventional ways (in keeping with communal norms) is also compatible with the 
formation of learners' reflective autonomy, in the longer-term interests of 
'strong-democratic' well-being. As suggested above, it is by coming to terms with 
predetermined curricular 'knowledge' with reflexive awareness of its conditioned 
construction that learners might meet the requirements of democratically prespecified 
standards and at the same time be equipped to view prescribed knowledge with some 
critical detachment and imaginative independence. With the gradual acquisition of a 
more richly inclusive and versatile conceptual framework, learners will also acquire their 
own interactive command of the 'veil of ignorance' en route to their attainment of an 
independent but revisable 'overlapping consensus'. The teachers' presence within this 
process of communicative grappling need not counteract its strong-democratic, 
mutually-decentering promise but can enhance it, in the spirit of the kinds of leadership 
advocated by Barber ('moral', 'transitional' and 'facilitating') - promoting and inspiring 
the co-operative virtues rather than adherence to settled, apodictic truths. A difficult line 
to maintain, therefore, is that between provocation and advocacy, between the unsettling 
of boundaries and their redefinition. In their role as 'transitional' and 'moral' leaders, 
non-manipulative teachers manifest a paradox: their first commitment is to facilitating an 
open educative process; yet it is also one from which they must be able to detach 
themselves, at least as equal participants with the learners. This 'detaching' is not to 
reinforce their superiority, but precisely the opposite - expediently to remove their 
authoritative presence from the learners' embryonic democratic culture. This 
self-effacement is expedient inasmuch as debate is thereby not made the occasion of 
substantive ideological conflict or consensus be~een the person of the teacher (as a 
significant authority figure) and the learners; but it is a democratically empowering tactic 
for the learners themselves, inasmuch as they are encouraged to engage on equal terms 
with each other, in probing the liminal spaces and ideological positions available to them. 











strategically deploying the veil of ignorance (effacing their 'known' superiority) to the 
benefit of the learners' dialogic capacity. This tactical effacement applies most obviously 
to areas of the study programme that invite debate, but also - less obviously - to 
reflection on customary disciplinary boundaries and curricular construction, where these 
are brought to critical awareness. Such effacement will not apply, however, to the kind of 
leadership role advocated by Barber (albeit, paradoxically, partially self-effacing in 
character) - a role that is given to facilitating active, equitable relationship in a process 
of reciprocal communication. In this way the roles of moral/transitional/facilitating 
leader are filled, while, at the same time, students are encouraged to reorient themselves 
equitably within an altered symbolic field, with due regard for the norms of an ideal 
speech situation, promoting free and equal communication amongst themselves in the 
search for representative decisions and 'forms' of relevant knowledge. . 
The peculiar character of the teachers' role might be clarified, perhaps, with 
reference to the contrast between the thin-liberal minimalist's passive recognition of 
plurality, and the 'strong' democrat's wrestling with plurality. Teachers, faced with a dual 
interest in an anti-manipulative educational task and in contextual social justice must 
give self-subsuming priority to the former (in the classroom) in the longer-term cause of 
the (undictated) latter. As has been indicated, however, the educative task comprises a 
concern both for the learners' developing critical autonomy and for the curricular 
dimension of communally valued knowledge. Barber's insight into the potential of the 
minimalist disposition of thin liberal democracy for conversion into the collective 
symbolic action of strong democracy is suggestive here, intimating the nature of the 
teacher's role as a transitional, catalytic 'leader' in educative relationships. Where 
controversial issues of local importance are concerned, which happen not to be subject to 
prescribed curricular resolution, teachers should restrain their personal ideological 
interest in the outcome of the learners' exploratory debate, but without necessarily 
forsaking their role as agent provocateur of the liminal imagination, which stimulates the 
intrinsically counterhegemonic potential of self-produced "meaning. This ideological 
restraint amounts to a tactical acceptance of the minimalist's stance of non-participation 
and tolerance, but in the longer-term cause of a more genuine participatory autonomy 
(by the learners) in the future. The 'modus vivendi' relationship, too, suggests this 
suspension of full-blooded ideological contestation - but in the cause of the participants' 
developing capacity for constructive mutual engagement. Thus the problematization and 
interrogation of assumptions, in the educational context, should wherever possible 
(without controverting the teachers' educational accountability) be pursued by the 











the desired fruits of an education for democracy. are therefore, in this view, necessary 
tactical and ethical positions for teachers in their partially self-effacing effort to give 
effect to the learners' reflective autonomy. In this way the dual educative responsibility -
for promoting approved curricular knowledge and the critical 'reasoning' aptitude of 
interactive agents - might be met. This dual educative task insists on the distinction 
between an enabling capacity for reflective awareness, in the interests of democratic 
empowerment, and a complacent reliance on instructions concerning what is good. 
Accordingly, an education for a postmodern democracy, while it does not eschew the 
prospect of salvific contextual truth, insists on educative leadership that retains a respect 
for the line between judiciously reticent provocation and substantive advocacy, in the 
longer-term democratic cause of positive collaboration amongst self-responsible citizens. 
Although teachers might fairly be expected to fulfil their obligation to a community in 
purveying the cultural knowledge embodied in curricular content (assuming that this is at 
the community's democratic behest), they must, equally, not forego a concern for the 
reflectively enlarging (and therefore democratically enabling) capacity of the learners' 
liminal imagination and the variousness on which it thrives. It is this that underlies the 
renovating capacity of a self-cultivating public sphere, whatever the local exigencies 
might happen to be. The counterhegemonic power of this transgressive, visionary, 
associative faculty is what sustains a postmodern democracy and the collective symbolic 
movement deemed appropriate to different times and places. The teachers' 
responsibility for education as the medium of communally sanctioned knowledge should 
not be travestied by inducing in learners a relationship of dependency on foreordained 
authority. What needs to be nurtured through education is the discursive capacity that 
will enable learners - as potential citizens - to place pre-existent boundaries and 
categories under threat of cancellation or collaborative. redefinition, notwithstanding 
their initial reliance on such formative and delimiting categories for primary 
enculturation. 
The various arguments considered in this thesis all give credence to the need for 
positive public knowledge but also for openness to 'difference' as an ever-necessary 
prerequIsite of critically-reflexive hypothesis-formation. Democratic representativeness 
is incompatible with the totalising claims of an unrevisable order of truth. Unreflective 
discourse-censorship in accordance with received wisdom conflicts with a respect for 
human agency, as manifested in the strong-democratic talk that maintains an 
experimental 'fluid edge' between opening and closing, limits and trangression. For this 
reason, an education for a postmodern democracy must not be reduced to a 











to the win of the community In respect of needful cultural knowledge. If 
strong-democratic communal life is to survive as a credible option, teachers ought to 
show a signal regard for the learners' gradual understanding of both the enabling and 
repressing effects of unstable symbolic codes. Established belief-systems are equally 
two-edged, threatening to confine as wen as to express a formative will, for both 'adults' 
and 'children'. There is a valuable and necessary distinction, and relation, between 
radical uncertainty and conditional 'certainty, which is reminiscent of the unsettling 
cyclical interdependence of 'phases' characteristic of the empirico-analytic research 
paradigm - a phase of maximal openness (receptiveness to relatively unsystematised 
'data'), a phase of publicly accessible hypothesis-formation and experimental 'testing', 
and a phase of theory-formation with regard to publicly attestable 'results'. This thesis 
argues that an education for a post modern democracy is dedicated to the health of the 
first phase, despite its necessary regard also for approved curricular content finding its 
warrant in collective experience and prevailing opinion. The health of the first phase, 
sustaining the critical animus of Foucauldian 'thought', demands a degree of flexibility in 
the learners' frameworks of meaning, permitting the reflexive decentering that conduces 
to self-responsible interdiscursive relations, in the process of participatory 
hypothesis-formation in specific contexts 'Of need. Attendant communal experience of 
experimental public policies might well 'confirm' the wisdom and virtue of the chosen 
options, thereby contributing to the induction of provisionally stable or 'certain' public 
knowledge. Post modern insights concerning the socially relative construction of the 
subject and of 'rational' knowledge do not therefore negate the salutary binding force of 
conditionally verified theory. Rather, they insist that such stabilising certainties, 
threatening a future commodification of culture, must be perpetually exposed to the 
cancelling test of otherness or difference, as sponsored by an openness to unforeseen 
data, alternative perspectives, and new languages of possibility. The capacity and 
willingness to engage this phase is the particular concern of an education for a 
postmodern democracy, allowing all citizens to acknowledge the 'essential' contestability 
and revisability of established beliefs and practices, and to anticipate creative 
alternatives. Although this liminal imagination must bear contextually relevant 
consequences, engendering relatively determinate forms of social practice, teachers 
should orient their efforts not merely to producing or reproducing a sanctioned cultural 
or ideological formation but to activating in their students the less directed power of 
reciprocal formativeness. This, while it is the necessary co-implicate of more definitive 
'forms' of belief and practice, is also the invigorating occasion of transgressive and 
reformative movement. In education, the products of this critically formative capacity 










of self-made discussion. In reality, however, they will often lack the discursive and 
conceptual means of engaging meaningfully with topical or novel issues, and will depend 
on the teacher for appropriate stimulation. Further, where learners remain appreciably 
unaware of the codes and values inhering in their beliefs and practices - and specifically 
where these counteract the equal reciprocity of strong-democratic dialogue - it behoves 
teachers as equitable facilitating 'leaders' to expose them to reflective consciousne~s as 
significant conditioning factors, in the interests of the fonnal 'process' of education as 
manifested in, and qualified by, its particular historical context. This is a dangerous 
moment, at which the student might well passively succumb to the preferences of the 
teacher. There is no guarantee that covert manipulation of this kind will not occur; the 
most that can be done, perhaps, is to emphasise the self-defeating nature and 
undemocratic consequences of a practice that merely replaces one fonn of uncritical 
dependency for another. 
It was noted in Chapter Two that despite an expressed opposition to authoritarian 
fixity by the proponents of different educational and social theories in South Africa, they 
all nonetheless resort to substantive position-taking as an educational a priori in our 
historical context. Proponents of Christian National Education qualify their recognition 
of contingency and neighbourliness by an affinnation of inflexible racial boundaries; 
proponents of liberal education endorse a broad oppositional alliance against the 
injustice of apartheid and, less obviously, against associated forms of inequality; and 
certain proponents of People's Education endorse specified group or class leadership 
roles in the name of democratic justice. The problematic issue is the degree to which a 
pre-specified political affiliation forecloses on autonomous thought, despite being 
propounded in the avowed cause of democratic enlargement. In defence of an open 
educative and political process sides must be taken, in an unjust context; yet the taking of 
sides in defence of a counterhegemonic autonomy must not be wholly equated with 
substantive factionalism. The conditional reconciliation of a formal 'openness' with the 
taking of sides in a given context can only be through respect for a communicative ideal 
which accommodates diversity as fuel for the strong-democratic deliberation that 
validates public hypotheses as the expression of a revisable democratic will. Only in this 
way will the dangers of doctrinaire dictatorship and unself-critical habit be guarded 
against. The arguments considered in this thesis give collective warrant for affirming the 
necessary distinction, and relation, between substantive contextual solutions to specific 
inequities, and the non-prescriptive y~t legitimating 'norms' of a 'fonnal' communicative 
or discourse ethic. The two are liable to be reductively equated in particular contexts, 












counterhegemonic force of the liminal imagination is thus 'contained' by dominant 
interpretations of social experience. A monologic conflation of the empirical and 
transcendental 'moments' of validity claims is indeed an ever-dangerous threat. The two 
are not finally co-extensive, however, and it is this reductive equation that an education 
for a postmodern democracy must help to avoid, without denying the 'obligatory' moment 
of empirical decision, with its substantively normative effects (as the product of 
democratic dialogue). It is, of course, through approved curricula that such normative 
knowledge, supposedly bearing democratic warrant, is partly mediated, in accordance 
with the cultural mandate and office of the teacher, as a servant of the community. 
Clearly the liminal imagination takes meaningful effect only to the degree that 
situated social actors are concretely liberated into truly free and equal participatory 
relations with their fellows. Its transgressive formativeness is anomalous in abstraction; 
reference to its transcendent, non-substantive and mobile character is not intended to 
remove it from the realm of social practice but to insist on its materially 
underdetermined iconoclasm, transgradience and vision. The freedom it bespeaks is not 
ever wholly unconditioned; instead it acknowledges the dispersed symbolic network in 
which signifying labour is partially and fallibly done, and it brings back into the field of 
serious play what is marginalised and occluded, so desublimating the orders of meaning 
encoded in customary discriminatory practices and relations. It exploits gaps, aporia, 
fracta, indeterminacies and inconsistencies to undermine the foundations and crack the 
smooth facade of established wisdom, in whatever historical context it happens to be. It 
is the implicit stimulus of communicative action, sustaining the critical and creative 
collaboration of social agents, who expose dominant discursive practices to the threat of 
perpetual morphogenesis by continuously shaping the democratic will and submitting it 
to the ongoing 'test' of public experience, dialogically defined. The formal-procedural 
'educating' proposed by Morrow ;is suitably anti-manipulative and non-technicist accords 
well with the unprogrammatic dynamism that is at issue here. Equally compatible with 
the revisionary power of the liminal imagination is Barrett's idea of 'reasoning' as the 
indeterminative goal of education - a reasoning capacity that is 'not a respecter of 
cultural boundaries'. Its counterhegemonic force is clearly a source of ideological or 
cultural vigour, while being intrinsically of no self-evident party. It enables. the reflexive 
bracketing of customary ground motives, so giving more concrete meaning to the open 
neighbourliness advocated by Heyns and others. The cross-cutting connection it makes 
possible, and on which it thrives, has much in common with the 'paralogy' that inspires 
the Lyotardian 'incredulity towards metanarratives'; yet it also has much in common with 











agreement - a striving that 'bursts every provinciality asunder', so subjecting them to 
more broadly legitimated (but never final) change. Habermas's conception of 
'philosophy' as the 'placeholding' guarantor of the openness and trans discursive 
movement of communicative action is compatible despite apparent rhetorical 
differences - with Lyotard's 'general agonistics', born of dissension and difference, 
expressing a dynamic struggle for meaning. Foucault's depiction of the work of 'thought', 
too, is pertinent here, as the mark of an intransigent freedon a recalcitrance, 
scepticism and critical detachment that sponsors the 'agonism' of i1}teractive 
self-production. This 'critical ontology' of ourselves is typified by an 'attitude' that puts 
us in the position of 'always beginning again', a notion reminiscent of Rawls's 'original 
position', insisting that we put our customary social perspectives and roles under erasure, 
by deploying the 'veil of ignorance', in an ongoing effort to challeng"e and enlarge our 
collective lives. The metaphoric unsettling of boundaries and the heterogeneity of 
'language games' which prompt Rorty's 'aesthetic pragmatism' can be reconciled with 
Habermas's 'universal pragmatics' (despite rhetorical differences) in respect of their 
orientation to the relational openness that secures the prospect of alternative, 
unpredictable conjunctions. MacIntyre's desire for virtuous action reflecting shared 
understandings of narrative purpose arrived at through the experience of conflict implies, 
too, a capacity of imaginative sympathy and self-revision that presupposes the 
self-subsuming power of the liminal imagination, notwithstanding inevitable social limits 
on individual freedom. Wexler's productive 'textualism' is clearly to the point as well for 
its redeeming of signifying activity and joint refiguring labour. Our responsiveness to the 
unembodied future is indicated as much by transcendental and utopian ideas as by the 
serious play of discursive mobility and inter-animation, and our mutual capacity to 
control, generate, refigure, configure and extrapolate the signifier. 
The theoretically cognate notions juxtaposed above reflect different but not 
incompatible efforts to describe a reciprocal openness to provocative 'otherness', as the 
prerequisite of maximally enlarged and 'justified' communal perceptions, whether or not 
an achieved social coherence is conceived of as an imaginative or a rational 'product'. 
The legitimacy of such democratically validated knowledge will have to serve as a 
conservative counterweight - but, to the learner, an initially enabling counterweight -
to incessant uncertainty and transformation. The 'reasoning' process advocated by 
Barrett, characterised as not being a 'respecter of cultural boundaries', must clearly be 
tempered by respect for such provisionally ratified products of open debate. The 
teachers' role must be seen not merely as that of a destabilising provocateur, but 











perceptions. However, these communal perceptions should themselves be the uncoerced 
products of a maximally inclusive process of social conversation and struggle. This 
normative, ethical dimension of mutual, self-responsible openness is expressed, as has 
appeared, in terms of an ideal reciprocity and symmetry of communicative relationship, 
despite the disparate rhetoric of different writers. It is this formal ideal of a 
(trans )formative, but never wholly formed, signifying capacity that an education for a 
postmodern democracy should nurture, notwithstanding the limits of prescribed 
curricular material. As has been stated, this cannot mean complete detachment from 
contextual dependencies or socio-ideological pressures; but it is a signal contention of 
this thesis that autonomous participation in the process of democratic decision-making 
requires the reflexive decentering of self in the cause of a critically justified solidarity 
with others. This self-subsuming capacity will necessarily find its fulfilment in the heat of 
actual social struggle; but it will be nullified and defrauded by the precipitate ideological 
direction of well-meaning but indirectly manipulative authority figures, whose 
formulations may well pre-empt rather than provoke non-dependent, interactive 
'thought', and so habituate learners en masse to a 'following' role and to a mystified or 
presumptuous parochialism. 
An education for a postmodern democracy is thus intended to sow the seeds of the 
strong-democratic participation that communitarians such as Barber and MacIntyre 
regard as the enabling virtue of the Enlightenment. Although they eschew 
Enlightenment 'rationalism' (glossed as objectivist and instrumentalist) in favour of 
socially-embedded narrative 'struggles' for meaning, their stance ought not to be 
unsympathetic to Habermas's 'communicative rationality', which is held by him to 
redeem the counter hegemonic potential of modem reason what he calls the 
'counterdiscourse of modernity'. Education must give due respect to the learners' 
enactment of a gradual 'fall' from innocence: their possible distanciation from the 
unquestioned authority of any conventional framework, so testifying to the non-absolute, 
socially conditioned nature of its structured cultural significance. The learners' 
increasing ability to negotiate their own perspective through dialogic struggle is especially 
necessary in historical contexts such as our own, which invite easy side-taking at the cost 
of the more testing reciprocal receptiveness that engenders reflective independence. 
This is not to say that a relation between a moral concern for social justice in the present, 
and a non-prescriptive dedication to the educative 'process' and the learners' anticipated 
autonomy as self-reflective agents, may not be held to coincide with a specific ideological 
alliance; but as this thesis has argued, such a contextually relevant alliance is best 











of a determinate political faction but rather in continued defence of a largely 
non-coercive ideal speech situation, manifesting a normative reciprocity that unsettles 
and decentres even as it aspires to a perfect, not-yet-embodied consensus. 
This 'ecological' dynamism between openness and hypothetical closure is not an 
easy relation to maintain (as Muller, Fay and Bowers have stressed); but if the dangers of . 
authoritarian onmicompetence are to be withstood, the reality of contingency and 
fallibility must be built into our culture of democratic decision-making, and particularly 
into education, that must enhance learners' refiguring engagement with language. This 
will enable them to contribute purposively to socially formative speech and collective 
symbolic action, in changeable contexts of need. The discursive constitution of social 
understanding is best fostered, therefore, by the open mutuality of interactive speech that 
illuminates the networking of lifeworld structures and the normalizing effects of 
'biopower' in specific structured situations. Such hermeneutic attunement to an 
internally stratified narrative culture nurtures the liminal imagination and the differential 
reasoning power of Habermas's communicative rationality. These provide a rich and 
expansive 'data base' for the shaping of context-relative, public hypotheses as the fruit of 
an ongoing 'state of discussion' marked by provisional 'overlapping' agreements. Social 
'virtue' thus attains concrete meaning through a shared exploration of narrative purpose, 
without forsaking the necessary legitimating condition of exposure to critical 
interrogation and possible transformation. A postmodern democracy does not neglect 
the necessary co-ordinating role of larger theoretical structures and unifying categories, 
but sees these, crucially, as subject to ongoing collaborative reinscription by mutually 
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